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Chapter 1. Introduction and Overview 
1.1. Introduction 
In 2015, the market reacted negatively to aviation stocks after a Germanwings pilot 
deliberately crashed an aircraft with 150 people on board into the French Alps (Welle, 
2015). This shows that firms do not always benefit from their rivals’ failures and that a 
failure can sometimes adversely affect an entire industry. Called the "contagion effect", or 
in short, "contagion", this phenomenon has attracted considerable interest in research about 
financial crises and how effects spread through company networks. The concept of 
contagion was first used in the financial economics field by David Ricardo in 1797, who 
witnessed a panic leading to the suspension of deposit withdrawals by the Bank of England 
(Kelly and Grada, 2000). However, "contagion" became a common term after July 1997, 
when it was used to describe the rapid spread of a financial crisis that began in Thailand, 
moving throughout East Asia and then on to Russia and Brazil (Claessens and Forbes, 
2001).  
There is no universally accepted definition of contagion in the literature;1 however, in 
general, contagion refers to the spread of an effect or behavior throughout a network. In 
this paper, contagion means the propagation of adverse consequences of a firm’s failure to 
the other firms in the same industry. Given this definition, contagion can also be called the 
"secondary effect", as opposed to the "primary effect", which refers to an event’s impact on 
                                                          
1 Forbes and Rigobon (2002) consider that contagion is only true contagion if there is no dependence between 
the markets prior to the shock. In this case, contagion is a pronounced increase in the dependence of the 
markets. Bekaert, Harvey and Ng (2005) consider that contagion can be described as an excess of correlation 
between markets, more than it can be explained by economic fundamentals. Corsetti, Pericoli and Sbracia 
(2005) regard contagion as a break in the parameters governing the correlation system. Kaminsky, Reinhart 
and Vegh (2003) define contagion as the instant effect following a shock that progresses rapidly between the 
markets. According to this approach, if the propagation is gradual to the other markets, episodes cannot be 
regarded as contagion, but as a spillover episode.  
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the liable firm. Like other risks, contagion risk can be measured either by its probability or 
by the combination of its probability and impact.  
Contagion is different from spillover. Spillover happens when an effect automatically 
spreads to other firms through fundamental links, whereas contagion occurs when the 
impact involves judgment and decision making and spreads through behavioral or social 
mechanisms. For example, when two firms share a supplier, one firm’s failure can distress 
the supplier’s operations. When the supplier’s operational distress automatically leads to a 
supply disruption for the second firm, the effect is called spillover. However, when the 
supplier decides to suspend or terminate the supply to the second firm, the effect is called 
contagion (see Figure 1-1).  
 
Figure 1-1: Spillover vs. Contagion 
 
The scope of contagion can vary from a specific sector of the economy (sectoral 
contagion) limited to a particular industry (e.g., the Three Mile Island nuclear accident in 
1979)2, geographical region (e.g., Toyota’s acceleration pedal recall in 2009)3, or market 
                                                          
2 The accident crystallized anti-nuclear safety concerns among activists and the general public, resulted in 
new regulations for the nuclear industry, and has been cited as a contributor to the decline of a new reactor 
construction program that was already underway in the 1970s (Severnini, 2017). 
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(e.g., the U.S. mad cow crisis in 2003)4, to an entire economy (e.g., September 11, 2001 
terrorist attacks).   
Beyond operational failure, contagion can also happen because of an operational 
breach. For example, Volkswagen’s software manipulation of diesel vehicles resulted in an 
emission scandal that caused the market to react to other German automobile 
manufacturers (Trefis, 2015). In this study, "failure" refers to both operational failure and 
operational breach. 
Contagion is generated by a triggering event which, in turn, is caused by an initiating 
event (Figure 1-2). For example, the Fukushima Nuclear disaster in 2011 involved a 
tsunami (an initiating event) that caused explosions (a triggering event), which ultimately 
led to the shutdown of all nuclear power plants in Japan (a contagion effect). This 
distinction is very important from the risk management perspective, because initiation 
events are difficult to control, while triggering events are generally controllable.  
 
 
Figure 1-2: Sequence of events in the contagion process 
 
Since the triggering event is subject to the initiating event, the probability of contagion 
is ultimately characterized by the initiating event. If the probability of the initiating event is 
                                                                                                                                                                                
3 A survey conducted on Toyota's accelerator pedal problem in 2009 showed that the public connected only 
Asian automakers with the problem (Automotive News, 2010). 
 
4 U.S. ranchers and processors lost almost $11 billion in revenue between 2004 and 2007 after major 
importers barred U.S. beef following the discovery of mad cow disease in the United States (Doering, 2008). 
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known, the probability of contagion can be determined, and hence the focal firm is in a 
"risk situation". Otherwise, the firm encounters an "uncertainty situation".5 The distinction 
between risk and uncertainty situations may affect the focal firm’s decision analysis, but 
such a distinction will not affect the possibility of identifying the contagion effect, so long 
as the triggering event can be defined or simply constructed. For example, we know the 
entire Japanese nuclear power industry will likely be shut down (a contagion effect) if 
another accident similar to the Fukushima Daiichi disaster (2011) happens, whether or not 
it is possible to determine the probability of large tsunamis.6  
The review of contagion cases shows that contagion is manifest in at least three forms: 
a) demand disruption; b) supply disruption; and c) operating cost increase. The review also 
shows that there are at least three types of triggering events, i.e., i) product harm events, ii) 
operating events, and iii) social/environmental events.7 Depending on the type of the 
triggering event and the form of contagion manifestation, contagion can be classified into 
nine types as exhibited in Table 1-1.  
As depicted in Figure 1-3, the field of contagion risk management can be divided into 
four areas, including: 1) contagion analysis, 2) contagion risk assessment, 3) contagion 
measurement, and 4) contagion risk management strategies. Contagion analysis is mainly 
                                                          
5 In the literature, the word "risk" has been used to refer to different meanings. The most common uses are: 1) 
Risk as a threat: "What risks threaten our business?", 2) Risk as probability: "What is the risk of going 
bankrupt?", and 3) Risk as consequence: "What is the risk of non-compliance with emission regulations?". 
However, in addition to these meanings, risk is also used to refer to a state. This refers to a situation where 
the probabilities of the alternatives are known ex-ante or can be reliably estimated. Under this definition, risk 
contrasts with uncertainty, which refers to a situation where probabilities are not measurable (Knight, 1921). 
 
6 In the process of risk assessment, managers and decision-makers are sometimes more concerned with the 
risk associated with a specific case under consideration, and not with the likelihood of the average outcomes 
that may result from various risk situations. 
 
7 Sometimes an initiating event can cause multiple simultaneous triggering events. For instance, following a 
fire on an oil rig in the Gulf of Mexico in 2010, the oil rig sank (operational event) and more than five million 
barrels of oil spilled into the sea (social event).  
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about characterizing contagion and understanding the mechanisms of propagation and 
elements involved in this process. 
 
Table 1-1: Types of contagion 
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In 2003, following the 
detection of a single case 
of mad cow disease on a 
farm in northern Alberta, 
international customers 
stopped buying Canadian 
beef (Statistics Canada, 
2009). 
In 2015, after a shipment 
from India was found to 
contain a foreign insect, 
Vietnam stopped importing 
peanuts from India (VBN, 
2015). The failure of an 
importer to control its 
shipments disrupted supply 
to all other importers.  
Following the recall of 
Tylenol painkillers in 1982, 
the FDA tightened packaging 
regulations, causing the 
pharmaceutical industry to 
lose a total of $8.68 billion 
(Dowdell et al., 1992). 
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In 2011, following an 
accident in a Fukushima 
nuclear power plant 
designed by GE, Germany 
and Switzerland decided to 
phase out nuclear power 
entirely, and Italy decided 
to abandon plans to build 
new nuclear plants  
(Kagramanyan, 2012). 
GE’s design failure 
affected the demand for 
other technology 
providers. 
Following the crash of two 
American Airline flights into 
World Trade Center towers 
on September 11, 2001, the 
private insurance market 
stopped providing insurance 
coverage for airlines 
(Kunreuther and Michel-
Kerjan, 2004). 
American Airline’s security 
failure affected the insurance 
coverage of other airlines. 
In 2010, a fire on an oil rig 
chartered by BP caused 
insurance premiums for deep 
water oil exploration to 
increase (Kollewe, 2010). 
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Following the death of 
more than 1,000 garment 
workers in the collapse of 
the Rana-Plaza building 
which housed a number of 
separate garment factories, 
Disney stopped buying 
from its Bangladeshi 
manufacturers, although 
none of them were 
associated with the event 
(Greenhouse, 2014). 
The supply of live cattle to 
Indonesian slaughterhouses 
was suspended after the 
Australian government 
banned live cattle exports to 
Indonesia because of the 
mistreatment of animals at 
some slaughterhouses 
(Minister for Agriculture, 
2011). One  slaughterhouse’s 
behavior  affected the supply 
of  live cattle  to other 
slaughterhouses. 
 
After the spill of about 5 
million barrels of oil into the 
Gulf of Mexico in 2010, the 
U.S. government tightened 
offshore oil and gas 
regulations, costing the 
industry hundreds of millions 
of dollars (Enerknol Research, 
2015). 
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Contagion risk assessment involves developing mathematical methods for formulating 
probability distribution or evaluating the risk of contagion. In contagion measurement, the 
focus is on evaluating the impact of certain events happening in certain industries. The aim 
of studies in this area is to identify the events that can cause contagion in the future. 
Finally, contagion risk management strategies is about studying and developing different 
plans and policies that can either mitigate the probability or control the consequences of 
contagion.  
The following section briefly explains how each chapter of the dissertation contributes 
to the four areas. 
 
Figure 1-3: Areas of contagion management risk field 
 
1.2. Dissertation Overview 
This dissertation is organized into five chapters. This section explains how chapters 
two to five construct the dissertation.   
Chapter 2 aims to build the theoretical foundations needed for chapters three and four 
and hence contributes to the first area of the field of contagion risk management (Figure 1-
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3). Using theories and examples of contagion in different industries, this chapter identifies 
the elements involved in the contagion process and the key attributes of each element. The 
chapter provides a brief history of contagion, defines contagion risk, and conceptualizes the 
contagion process and the relationship between factors contributing to the process, while 
focusing on the role of stakeholder as the agent of risk. The chapter also explains how a 
failure of a rival in the industry can cause a firm’s stakeholders to react adversely to the 
firm.  
Chapter 3 is founded on the propositions of Chapter 2. The chapter provides empirical 
evidence on "sectoral contagion" and its relationship to the size of primary effect (impact 
on the liable rival) and severity of a triggering event as well as its signal value (the factor 
that causes perceived and actual risks of an event to be different). The study fits into the 
first type of contagion (see Table 1-1), where the type of event is product-harm and 
contagion is manifest in the form of demand disruption or reduction. The chapter evidences 
the role of signal value and introduces a method for operationalizing the construct. The 
result shows that contagion can occur, even when events are not extreme. Given its results, 
the chapter contributes to the second and third areas of the field. 
 Chapter 4 is about contagion risk management and fits into the fourth area of the field. 
The chapter uses the theoretical model of the contagion process discussed in Chapter 1 and 
employs economic modeling to find the condition under which investing in the safety of a 
rival could be profitable. The chapter highlights the difference between actual safety and 
perceived safety and formulates their relationship.  
Finally, Chapter 5 discusses the dissertation’s contributions and implications in light of 
extant research and discusses opportunities for future research. While inter-related, 
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chapters two to four can be read in any order, and readers can consider them as three 
independent academic essays. Each of the three chapters include an introduction and 
implications of the research questions, an overview of the related literature, methodology, 
results, and conclusions. Each chapter’s complete findings are below.  
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Chapter 2. Dynamics of Contagion Risk 
Abstract 
Contagion can cause significant loss to non-liable firms. This is a critical issue, especially 
for firms that over-comply with safety regulations, because they could be penalized for 
risks that they have already directly addressed, while other firms have not taken 
appropriate action. Contagion is a serious threat because it can happen even when the 
triggering event is not severe, or when the liable rival is small. With the goal of enabling 
low-risk firms to assess and manage contagion risk, I use real cases to conceptualize the 
contagion process and apply related theories and literature to theorize key factors 
contributing to contagion risk. I theorize that "stakeholder identity" plays a central role in 
the emergence of contagion risk. 
Keywords: Contagion Risk, Stakeholder Identity, Supply Chain Risk Management,  
 
2.1. Introduction 
As mentioned in the first chapter, sometimes one firm’s failure can adversely affect an 
entire industry. This effect, referred to as "contagion", is a well-recognized concept, 
especially in the area of financial economics. My search of the term "contagion" in the 
peer-reviewed financial economic journals returned more than 1,500 results. Contagion has 
also been studied in marketing in terms of the market reaction to an entire industry 
following a product recall announcement. A classic example is the Chicago Tylenol 
murders, where drug tampering in the Chicago metropolitan area in 1982 resulted in a 
series of deaths. Dowdell and his co-authors (1992) found that major firms in the 
10 
 
pharmaceutical industry lost a total of $8.68 billion after the Tylenol recall in 1982. This 
demonstrates how severe the contagion effect can be. However, what makes contagion an 
important risk is that it can be triggered by a small event happening to a small firm. For 
instance, the Canadian mad cow crisis, which cost the Canadian beef industry $7 billion, 
was initiated by the detection of a single case of mad cow disease that had not even entered 
the consumption chain. As mentioned in Chapter 1, contagion can manifest itself through 
demand disruption, supply disruption, or operating cost increases. This implies that 
contagion risk is a type of supply chain risk, which is caused by rivals. Most of the studies 
in the area of supply chain management have researched the risks associated either with 
buyers or suppliers, but to my best knowledge, no study has explored the supply chain risks 
posed by rivals. This paper attempts to fill this gap by answering the following research 
questions: (a) How do some adverse consequences spread from a rival to other firms in the 
same market or industry? (b) What factors contribute to this process? (c) Why do some 
events have a contagion effect, while others do not? And finally, (d) Why are some 
industries more susceptible to contagion than others?  
 
Figure 2-1: Sequence of conceptualizing the relationships between the attributes 
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To answer these questions, I use existing literature and theories in decision-making, 
cognitive psychology, and risk management fields, along with supporting examples of 
adverse events in different supply chains to theorize the key elements involved in the 
contagion process, the main attributes of the elements, and the relationships between the 
attributes and contagion (See Figure 1-4).  
The chapter sheds new light on the nature of contagion risk by exploring it from a 
decision-making view, highlighting the role of stakeholders as the agents of risk, and 
conceptualizing and integrating various types of contagion into a single process model. The 
next section further discusses the concept and the properties of contagion. 
 
2.2. Contagion process 
Based on the cases of events I reviewed, at least four key elements are involved in a 
contagion process (Figure 2-1): (a) triggering event, (b) liable rival, (c) focal firm facing 
contagion risk, and (d) stakeholder(s) of the focal firm. Stakeholders act as the agents of 
contagion risk. Therefore, the stakeholder is the center of analysis in this study. Although 
firms usually have multiple stakeholders, I explore the decision-making process of a single 
stakeholder to avoid unnecessary complexity. A stakeholder is “any group or individual 
who can affect or is affected by the achievement of the firm's objectives” (Takeuchi, 2010). 
Since organizations fundamentally rely on individuals to undertake activities, such as 
analyzing, assessing, and reacting to risks on its behalf, I use individual-level cognitive 
theories of risk behavior to theorize the factors contributing to a stakeholder’s judgment of 
risk and decision. As it is cumbersome to simultaneously deal with the individual and 
12 
 
corporate meanings of stakeholder, I consider stakeholders as either a group of individuals 
having one or more characteristics in common (e.g., consumers), or as an organization.  
When news spreads about a rival firm’s adverse event , stakeholders of every other 
firm in the industry (re-)evaluate the probability that similar events will occur at their firm. 
If the re-evaluated risk exceeds an acceptable level, the stakeholder may decide, or be 
forced by its constituents (the entities that have a legitimate interest in the stakeholder), to 
modify its relationship with the firm to address their own risk. The modification of the 
relationship can range from minor changes, such as adding clauses to a contract or 
decreasing the frequency and size of transactions, to the termination of the relationship.  
 
Figure 2-2: Elements involved in the contagion process 
 
A fundamental concept in my study is "risk judgement". Risk judgment could either be 
objective (actual) or subjective (perceived) (Rowe and Wright, 2001). This 
dichotomization arose from the observation that experts and laypeople often disagree about 
the risk level associated with different events (Taylor et al., 2014). An expert is defined as 
a person with a background in the subject area who is recognized by others as an expert in 
that area (Skjong and Wentworth, 2001). While objective risks are based on "expert 
judgments" or "assessments", subjective risks (the degree of uncertainty perceived by 
individuals) are derived from "lay judgments" or "perceptions". Objective definitions of 
13 
 
risk see it as a statistical expectation value of outcome severity. On the other hand, 
subjective risk is based on “people’s beliefs, attitudes, judgments and feelings, as well as 
the wider social or cultural values and dispositions that people adopt towards hazards and 
their benefits” (Pidgeon et al., 1992). Brun (1994) argues that, similar to objective risk, 
subjective definitions of risk tend to include event severity and uncertainty dimensions, but 
Slovic (1997) suggests that even if these were the only two dimensions included in lay 
perceptions, lay risk perception would still differ from expert risk assessments due to 
heuristics and bias that influence such quantitative estimates.  
Risk perception involves collecting, selecting, and interpreting signals about uncertain 
impacts of events, activities, or technologies (Wachinger et al., 2013). These signals can 
refer to either direct observation or information obtained from others. Perceived risk varies 
depending on the type of risk, the risk context, the personality of the individual, and the 
social context, and is influenced by knowledge, experience, values, attitudes, and feelings 
(Wachinger et al., 2010). 
In this research, an objective judgment process is used to evaluate contagion risk. 
However, stakeholders evaluate their risks through a process that involves a combination 
of objective and subjective judgments, depending on the stakeholder’s identity. 
Given the elements involved in the contagion process, I theorize the factors 
contributing to contagion risk and propose a framework illustrated in Figure 2-1.  
2.2.1. Theoretical framework  
As previously mentioned, a firm’s contagion risk refers to the probability of an adverse 
reaction of the firm’s stakeholder(s) pertaining to a specific triggering event. By definition, 
contagion risk is described and measured in association with a certain event or an event 
14 
 
type. An adverse event in the industry can stimulate the stakeholder’s concern about the 
occurrence of similar events to the focal firm and drive it to react if the stakeholder 
concludes that the firm is unable to manage the new state of risk. This suggests that 
contagion risk has a direct relationship to the change in the stakeholder’s judgment of the 
focal firm’s risk, which, in turn, derives from the change of the stakeholder’s judgments 
on: 
a) the seriousness of the event,  
b) the extent to which the focal firm is prone to similar events, and  
c) the ability of the focal firm to manage risk.  
An expert stakeholder’s judgment of the firm’s risk does not change through a single 
event, unless the event’s severity exceeds an estimated maximum threshold (informative 
contagion). However, a lay stakeholder’s judgment can be influenced, even if the event is 
not actually severe (naive contagion). The difference lies in their dissimilar approaches 
(subjective vs. objective) to risk evaluation. A subjective approach to  causes a non-
frequent event to be perceived as unlikely before it happens and very likely after it. A 
subjective approach can also cause a firm’s exposure to a given event to be overestimated 
when it is built on superficial similarities between the firm and its rival which has recently 
been affected by an event. When these distorted judgments are combined with the 
underestimation of the firm’s risk-management capability, they can lead to a severe 
reaction of the lay stakeholders to the firm. This difference between lay and expert 
approaches to risk judgment supports the theory that firms are at higher risk of contagion 
when their stakeholders decide like laypeople. Therefore, this paper explores "naive 
15 
 
contagion" and the process and factors that contribute to the misjudgment of risk by lay 
stakeholders (Figure 2-2).  
 
Figure 2-3: Factors contributing to contagion risk 
 
The key attributes of the four elements of contagion, namely event, liable rival, focal 
firm, and the focal firm’s stakeholder, impact a lay stakeholder’s judgment of risk. These 
attributes include (i) signal value (attribute of event), (ii) similarities to the focal firm 
(attribute of liable rival), (iii) stakeholders’ trust (attribute of focal firm), and (iv) identity 
and power (stakeholder attributes).  
2.2.2. Signal value of event 
Early theories linked social risk judgments and responses to event severity measured by 
deaths and casualties and/or cost of damages; however, events such as the Three Mile 
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Island nuclear accident in 1979 and the mad cow crises in Canada and the U.S. in 2003, 
which had no fatalities but caused huge social impacts, demonstrate that a property other 
than "severity" also contributes to the public’s perception of the event’s seriousness. This 
property is referred to as "signal value", the degree to which an event increases one's 
perception of the risk of similar or more destructive events in the future (Slovic, 1987). The 
process by which risks are intensified by lay stakeholders is explained by the Social 
Amplification of Risk Framework (Kasperson et al., 1988). According to the framework, a 
triggering event interacts with psychological, social, and cultural processes in ways that 
can intensify lay individuals’ perceptions of risk and related risk behavior (Kasperson et 
al., 2005). The signal value of an event is closely related to its perceived lack of control, 
catastrophic potential, fatal consequences, and the inequitable distribution of risks and 
benefits, as well as the extent to which its manifestation of harm is unobservable, 
unknown, new, and delayed in its manifestation of harm (Slovic et al., 1987). Given this 
explanation, we expect an event such as a train wreck with high fatalities to cause 
relatively little social disturbance because it occurs as part of a familiar and well-
understood system. However, a small event, such as a minor accident with a nuclear 
reactor, is expected to cause great public concern, as the accident is interpreted to mean 
that its risk is not well understood, not controllable, or not competently managed. Given 
the above discussion, I propose the following: 
 
Proposition 1: All other factors remaining unchanged, the higher the signal value of an 
event, the more likely it is that the event will change stakeholders’ judgment of risk.  
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2.2.3. Similarities between the liable rival and the firm 
By definition, lay individuals tend to use heuristics to deal with the full complexity and 
multitude of risks. Heuristics are simplified mechanisms and mental shortcuts used to 
evaluate risk and shape responses (Kahneman et al., 1982). One heuristic is the "similarity 
heuristic", which pertains to how people make judgments based on the similarity between 
current situations and other situations or situation prototypes. The goal of the similarity 
heuristic is to maximize productivity through a favorable experience while not repeating an 
unfavorable experience. This explains why lay individuals tend to use their past experience 
to shape their world view and incorporate them in their current experiences. Heuristics 
work well in most conditions; however, they can lead to systematic deviations from logic, 
probability, or rational choice theory (Tversky and Kahneman, 1985). The resulting errors 
are referred as "cognitive biases", of which many different types have been documented. 
Cognitive biases resulting from similarity heuristics include ignoring prior probabilities, 
assuming that similarity in one aspect leads to similarity in other aspects, and assuming 
that a small sample is representative of a much larger population (Tversky and Kahneman, 
1982). A typical example of these biases is when consumers overestimate the extent that a 
firm superficially similar to an unsafe rival is prone to the same event that hit the rival, 
even though the firm is from a population containing relatively safe firms. The similarity of 
a firm to its rival can lie in its product, process, technology, supply chain, or origin. For 
instance, in their studies on automobile recalls, Crafton et al. (1981) and Reilly and Hoffer 
(1983) showed that industry rivals that produce similar lines of cars suffer declines in sales 
following serious automobile recalls. As another example, a survey conducted on Toyota's 
accelerator pedal problems in 2009 showed that the public connected other Asian 
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automakers, including Honda, Hyundai, and Nissan, with the problems (Faktenkontor, 
2009). In explanation of this finding, an expert argues that in customers' minds, Toyota 
ranked highest in quality among Asian carmakers, leading them to conclude that other 
manufacturers with the same origin (Asia) would have even more problems with quality 
(Automotive News, 2010). I propose the following: 
 
Proposition 2: All other factors remaining unchanged, the higher the similarities between 
the firm and the liable rival, the more likely it is that an event will change stakeholders’ 
judgment of risk. 
2.2.4. Trust in the firm  
Almost all types of social relationships, including risk management, rely on trust. In fact, 
most of the argument in risk management has been related to the existing distrust between 
the public (lay individuals), industry, and risk management professionals (e.g., Slovic, 
1993, Slovic et al., 1991). In order to understand the role of trust, it is helpful to compare 
the risks lay stakeholders fear and those they do not. Slovic (1990) found that people 
perceive less risk from medical technologies, which are based on the use of radiation and 
chemicals (i.e., x-rays and prescription drugs), than industrial technologies involving 
radiation and chemicals (i.e., nuclear power, pesticides, and industrial chemicals). 
Although x-rays and prescription drugs pose significant risks, people’s relatively high 
degree of trust in the physicians who manage these devices makes them appear safer. In 
contrast, numerous polls have demonstrated that government and industry officials who 
manage nuclear power and nonmedical chemicals are not highly trusted (Cvetkovich, 
2013).  
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Keh and Xie (2008) found that in times of crisis, high levels of trust have the power to 
increase confidence and decrease perceived danger. Similarly, situational crisis 
communication theory posits that a history of crises can negatively influence the reputation 
of and trust in the firm and shape consumers’ perceptions of future crises (Coombs and 
Holladay, 2001, 2002). Seo et al. (2014) found that following the E-Coli outbreak in its 
restaurants in 2003, Jack in the Box’s stock prices showed significantly negative responses 
to other firms’ food crises that occurred from 2004 to 2010. 
The role of trust in risk perception may also explain why domestic beef consumption 
did not decline after the announcement of a single case of mad cow disease in Alberta in 
2003 caused international customers to ban Canadian beef; in fact, it increased by more 
than five per cent (Statistics Canada, 2004). While this could have been related to the drop 
in domestic beef prices due to the plunge in international demand,  consumers would not 
have risked consuming contaminated beef without having trust in beef suppliers. I propose 
the following: 
 
Proposition 3: All other factors remaining unchanged, the higher the stakeholder’s trust in 
the focal firm, the less likely it is that an event will change their judgment of risk. 
2.2.5. Stakeholder’s identity 
A stakeholder is a body of lay and expert individuals who evaluate risks and make 
decisions. As discussed, experts use statistical data, such as annual fatalities, in their 
assessments of an adverse event’s severity, whereas laypeople rely on heuristics and 
qualitative risk characteristics. These differing methods often result in laypeople assigning 
relatively little weight to risk assessments conducted by technical experts or government 
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officials (Covello et al., 1987), leading to an overestimation of the severity of a feared 
event. In reality, experts are prone to many of the same biases and heuristics as those of the 
general public, especially when they are forced to go beyond the limits of available data 
and rely on intuition and extrapolation (Kahnemann et al., 1982, Henrion and Fischhoff, 
1986). However, they are less likely to make mistakes as a result of these biases, because 
they employ calculative modes of reasoning (as opposed to intuitive reasoning) more 
frequently to analyze risks (Ropeik, 2009; Sunstein, 2003). As the percentage of expert 
decision-makers relative to the total decision-makers in a group of individual stakeholders 
or in an organization (non-individual stakeholder) varies from zero to one hundred, the 
"identity" of a stakeholder can vary along a spectrum from "absolute-lay" to "absolute-
expert" (Figure 2-4).  
 
Figure 2-4: Spectrum of stakeholder identity 
 
I define the "identity of a stakeholder" as the extent to which a stakeholder relies on the 
judgment of experts, as opposed to laypeople, to evaluate risk and make a decision. The 
closer the identity of the stakeholder is to absolute-expert, the more the stakeholder will 
rely on statistical data, while the closer they are to absolute-lay, the more they will rely on 
qualitative characteristics. As illustrated in Figure 2-2, "signal value of the event", 
"similarity between the firm and the liable rival", and "trust in the firm" are three main 
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factors that influence absolute-lay stakeholders and can drive them to overestimate the 
firm’s risk. This means that the risk of contagion diminishes as the identity of the 
stakeholder approaches to absolute-expert. 
Thirumalai and Sinha (2011)’s study explored the financial consequences of product 
recalls in the medical device industry and showed that the market penalties for medical 
device recalls are not significant. This finding is interesting when compared to the market 
reaction to recall announcements in other industries, such as food (Thomsen and 
McKenzie, 2001) and automotive (Jarrell and Peltzman, 1985; Bromiley and Marcus, 
1989), where the market’s recall penalties are significant. Hospitals and physicians 
(medical experts) make up a large part of the medical device customer group and are often 
in direct consultation with device manufacturers (technical experts) in making purchase 
decisions. Decision making across this group is strongly influenced by the policies of 
private insurance providers and Medicare/Medicaid, which are also bodies of experts. I 
argue that the previously mentioned difference in market reaction to medical device recalls 
is derived from the fact that the identity of the stakeholders involved in purchasing 
decisions in the medical device industry is closer to absolute-expert than other industries, 
such as food and automotive, where stakeholders are mainly groups of lay individuals, 
such as retail consumers. This leads to the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 4: Stakeholder identity moderates the relationship between the change in 
stakeholders’ judgment of risk and signal value of event, similarities between firm and 
liable rival, and stakeholders’ trust in the firm. 
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For organizational (non-individual) stakeholders such as suppliers, distributors, or 
governments, identity is also influenced by the collective identity of constituents. Similar 
to stakeholders, the identity of constituents varies along a spectrum with two extremes of 
absolute-expert and absolute-lay. Fearful constituents within or outside the value system 
can put pressure on the stakeholder and influence its judgment of risk. For example, in the 
Tazreen fire disaster in 2012, a fire broke out in the Tazreen Fashion factory in Dhaka, 
Bangladesh. At least 117 people died in the fire and over 200 were injured, placing buyers, 
such as Disney, under intense pressure from consumers at home to address poor workplace 
safety in Bangladesh. As a result, Disney decided to withdraw operations from Bangladesh 
(Palmeri and Rupp, 2013). Tazreen was not an authorized supplier for Disney-branded 
products – neither for independent licensees producing their own product, nor for product 
sold by Disney through its own retail operations. In fact, what forced Disney to terminate 
its relationship with suppliers in Bangladesh was pressure from consumers and society 
(constituents) who perceived a high risk of non-compliance and negative social behavior. 
Disaster literature indicates that some industries engage in more mitigation and 
preparedness than others. For instance, Dahlhamer and D’Souza (1997) found that 
businesses in the finance, insurance, and real estate industries do more to prepare for 
disasters than businesses in other industries. Similarly, Drabek (1991, 1995) found that 
lodging businesses have more extensive disaster evacuation plans than businesses in the 
food service, entertainment, and travel industries. A plausible explanation could be that 
prepared industries are more sensitive to risk, and therefore involve more experts in their 
risk management decisions than other industries. If this is true, stakeholders from risk-
sensitive industries are expected to have an identity closer to absolute-expert than 
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stakeholders from industries that are less risk-sensitive. Larger stakeholders have more 
resources available to hire experts. A higher number of hired experts approximates the 
identity of a stakeholder to absolute-expert; however, the number of lay constituents 
generally increases as the size of the stakeholder group grows. Given these two opposite 
effects, the impact of a stakeholder group’s size on its identity is indefinite.  
2.2.6. Power of stakeholder 
Stakeholders need power to enforce desired changes in their relationship with the firm. 
There are many different ways of categorizing power as a construct in business research. 
However, from the source-of-power perspective, power can be classified into six types: 
reward power, coercive power, legitimate power, referent power, expert power, and 
informational power (French et al., 1959). The source of power is not mutually exclusive, 
and a stakeholder and firm may possess more than one power type. 
The extent to which a stakeholder can exert its power depends, not only on its own 
power, but on the power of the firm. Government and regulatory bodies are generally 
powerful stakeholders; however, their power is weakened when they depend on an industry 
for information (information power), or when an industry has strong economic bargaining 
power (coercive power). This was the case in the Jack in the Box E. coli outbreak. The 
meat industry in the U.S. is a powerful political force, both in the legislative and regulatory 
arenas, and most of the companies involved in the meat business are represented by one or 
more of the powerful meat trade and lobbying organizations. In 1995, the United States 
Department of Agriculture proposed implementing new food safety regulations in response 
to the Jack in the Box E. Coli outbreak that made hundreds of people sick. As discussed, 
new regulations can cause contagion by increasing operational costs of all the firms in the 
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industry. The meat industry succeeded in stopping the implementation of the new 
regulations, and therefore contagion, by persuading a member of the key appropriations 
committee to introduce an amendment to prolong the rulemaking process (Johnson, 2015).  
 Power also emerges through an unequal dependence between stakeholder and firm and 
could be detrimental for the weaker party (Stolte and Emerson, 1976). However, according 
to Emerson (1962), an increase in dependence asymmetry could be coupled with a 
simultaneous increase in the sum of partners’ dependencies on each other, which is referred 
to as "joint dependence”. Joint dependence can influence the stakeholder’s power derived 
from unbalanced dependency. According to embeddedness theory, higher levels of joint 
dependence must increase the depth of economic interaction between partners, building a 
stronger relational orientation (Uzzi, 1996, 1999). This results in more trust between 
partners and decreases the risk of power exertion. Following the Tazreen Fashion factory 
fire disaster in 2012, Disney decided to withdraw from Bangladesh, while other big names, 
including Walmart, initiated processes to improve factory safety and worker wellbeing. 
Given that, in both cases, dependence asymmetry favored retailers, the differences in the 
retailers’ reactions can be partially explained by differences in the levels of joint 
dependence in their relationships with garment manufacturers. This argument is supported 
by the fact that Walmart’s apparel revenue was over $20 billion in 2012 (Souza, 2013), 
while Disney’s total consumer product revenue was less than $4 billion (Statista, 2015). 
This suggests the following proposition: 
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Proposition 5: All other factors remaining unchanged, the higher the joint dependence 
between stakeholder and firm, the less likely it is that a stakeholder will modify its 
relationship with a firm because of a change in its judgement of risk. 
 
2.3. Summary and conclusion 
This essay attempts to theorize the contagion process. Building on a survey of adverse 
events in varying industries and a literature review, I demonstrate how a rival’s failure in 
risk management can unfavorably affect other firms’ supply, demand, and operations. 
Although the scope of the contagion effect in most of the cases discussed in this paper are 
industry-wide or market-wide, contagion can also occur in small segments of the market or 
industry. This implies that contagion may be more frequent than we think. A plausible 
reason that we do not hear much about the latter type of contagion might be that public 
interest is peaked only by events causing widespread contagion effect. I use relevant 
literature from psychology, sociology, and management to conceptualize the process of 
contagion and the contributing factors. I view contagion as a decision-making process and 
propose that the entities involved in contagion are the event, the liable rival, the focal firm, 
and the firm’s stakeholders. Contagion begins when an adverse event happens to a rival. 
The event triggers the stakeholder to re-evaluate the risk that a similar event will happen to 
the focal firm. If the evaluated risk exceeds an acceptable level, the stakeholder may 
modify its relationship with the firm to address the risk.  
Building on the literature about the differences between the approach of laypeople and 
experts to risk judgment (assessment vs. perception) and biases embedded in risk 
perception, I introduce the notion of "stakeholder identity". I contend that a stakeholder’s 
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judgment on the focal firm’s risk is more likely to be realistic when it has a closer identity 
to absolute-expert. Identity is based on the degree to which a stakeholder’s judgment of 
risk is objective as opposed to subjective. I suggest that the closer the identity of the 
stakeholder is to absolute-lay, the more its judgments and subsequent decisions will be 
based on biased measures including (a) signal value of the event, (b) similarity between the 
focal firm and the liable rival, and (c) trust in the focal firm’s risk management.  
I also highlight the role of the stakeholder’s power in the risk of contagion. I refer to 
power as the ability to enforce desired changes in the relationships for stakeholders. I argue 
that the relative power of a stakeholder diminishes as the power of the firm increases, and 
discuss some of the conditions in which this may happen. For example, the approach to 
regulating the industry can affect the power of government and regulatory authorities. 
When an industry is self-regulated and has bargaining power, there is a greater chance that 
the industry can block or postpone legislation processes, thereby limiting the risk of 
contagion. Dependence asymmetry in favor of a business partner, as a stakeholder, 
increases stakeholders’ power, but joint dependence (the sum of partners’ dependencies on 
each other) diminishes it. Therefore, the risk of contagion is higher when the joint 
dependency is weaker.  
A focal firm can estimate the potential signal value of a certain event from its position 
on the "Dread risk – Unknown risk" factor space to estimate the risk of contagion. The 
chance that the focal firm will resemble a liable rival can be measured by the industry’s 
commoditization level. The trust of the stakeholder in the focal firm’s risk management 
competence and power balance between the stakeholder and the focal firm can be assessed 
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from the history of their interactions. Although it is beyond the scope of this paper, how to 
measure the identity of a stakeholder is an important and interesting research question.  
I discussed two reactive and two proactive strategies to manage contagion risk. I 
explained how lobbying and publicizing can address the threat of tighter regulations and 
supply or demand disruption. I also discussed how self-regulating and investment in the 
safety of high-risk rivals can prevent the probability of contagion. 
In summary, I have identified a new research direction that can generate novel research 
questions on risk management in supply chain management. Specifically, I introduce the 
notions of contagion risk and “stakeholder identity”, conceptualize the factors influencing 
contagion risk, highlight the underlying role of stakeholder as the agent of contagion risk, 
and classify contagion risk according to the type of triggering event and form of contagion 
manifestation (see Table 1-1). On the practical side, my findings help risk managers design 
more effective risk management strategies in supply chain by integrating the risks that are 
imposed by rivals. The results derived from my research has important implications for 
supply chain and operations management scholarship, in that it explores contagion risk in 
the context of decision making processes, highlights the role of stakeholders as agents of 
risk, and conceptualizes and integrates various types of contagion into a single process 
model.  
A limitation of my research is that it is multi-layered and multi-theoretic and draws 
theories from multiple disciplines, making it challenging for the audience. I understand that 
going deeper into the various propositions in separate papers would help to address it; 
however, this is not possible before integrating the concepts, supporting theories, 
information, and terminology in one piece to build the foundations needed for further 
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research. Contagion, as a whole, is a coherent concept and its components are best 
understood in context and in relation to one another.   
Testing these theories using empirical methods is a natural direction for the future 
extension of this research. This can be done separately for each of nine different types of 
contagion risk discussed above. The main challenge in this direction is operationalizing the 
construct of “stakeholder identity”. The other direction for future research is to measure 
contagion risk. This involves a combination of analytical and empirical approaches to 
formulate and test the risk. The result of the research can then be used to develop an 
insurance policy for contagion risk.  
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Chapter 3. Empirical Evidence on Contagion  
Abstract 
This study is an early work attempting to measure the impact of contagion by using 
product recalls in two very different industries (meat and toy).  The study examines small 
to moderate events as opposed to extreme events, such as an explosion in a nuclear power 
plant, where contagion is clearly evident and documented. The focus on testing using 
samples from small to moderate recall events seems to have been lost somehow. The study 
explores the conditions under which a non-extreme event can trigger contagion. I find that 
"signal value" - the non-severity factor of an event, injury counts, recall size, and the size 
of the recalling firm can contribute to the level of contagion. 
Keywords: Contagion Risk, Event Study, Product Recall, Signal Value 
 
3.1. Introduction 
Most of the documented cases of contagion in the world were triggered by extreme events; 
however, there are cases where the triggering events were not actually severe. For instance, 
when one of the Three Mile Island reactors partially melted on March 28, 1979, its small 
radioactive releases had no detectable health effects on the plant workers or the public. 
However, the accident turned the public against nuclear power, causing the nuclear 
industry to grind to a halt. Another example is the mad cow disease in 2003 in Canada 
where a single contaminated cow that never entered the food stream cost the live cattle and 
beef industry approximately $7B. 
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These observations pose the question of whether non-extreme events can also initiate 
contagion. This is an important research question because the result will indicate how 
frequent contagion is, and whether contagion risk should be included in the supply chain 
risk management strategy of every firm. To answer this question, I consider product safety 
recalls in the meat and toy industries. In my study, I hypothesize and test the relationships 
between the sectoral contagion8 effect and the key attributes of the industry, recalling firm, 
and recall.  
A product recall is a request to return a product after the discovery of safety issues or 
product defects that might endanger customers or put the maker/seller at risk of legal 
action. The rate of product recalls continues to expand mostly because of more powerful 
testing methods and tighter regulations (Anon, 2016). Several significant recalls occurred 
during the 2016 calendar year, affecting the marketplace across all product categories from 
dairy and poultry to clothing and automotive parts. The reason for choosing a product 
recall is two-fold. First, product recalls are not generally catastrophic; second, they are 
quite common when measured on the industry basis, although they rarely happen to a 
single firm.  
To measure the contagion effect, I use the "event study" methodology to capture the 
abnormal returns9 of the firms producing products similar to the recalled product around 
the recall announcement date. Some studies in the marketing and economics literature have 
                                                          
8 Sectoral contagion is a type of contagion that affects a specific sector of the economy limited to a particular 
industry (e.g., the Three Mile Island nuclear accident in 1979), geographical region (e.g., Toyota’s 
acceleration pedal problem in  2009), or market (e.g., the U.S. mad cow crisis in 2003) as opposed to "global 
contagion" which influences an entire economy. 
 
9 Abnormal return is the difference between the actual change in stock price and a benchmark to adjust for 
the overall industry and market-wide influences. 
37 
 
examined the "secondary effect".10 However, the issue with these studies is that their 
results are mixed and sometimes contradicting.  For instance, Hoffer et al. (1988) show that 
contagion is not statistically significant in the automotive industry. Dranove & Olsen 
(1984) find that the recalls of five dangerous drugs negatively affected competitors, while 
Ahmed et al. (2002) conclude that direct competitors see significant gains following drug 
withdrawals. Similarly, Govindaraj et al. (2004) find that competitors experienced a 
significant gain in market value following a recall by Bridgestone Corporation. 
Unfortunately, none of these studies discuss the factors that might have contributed to their 
findings. This is an important limitation, as testing the impact of an event without 
controlling for the covariates generally leads to erroneous statistical significance and false 
inference. For example, firms offering diverse substitute products could remain unaffected 
following a product recall made by a rival, while those selling only products similar to the 
recalled product may be affected significantly. Ignoring the impact of product diversity can 
create either type I or type II errors, depending on the sample structure. To address this 
limitation, I test the contagion effect of recall announcements in this study while 
controlling for several factors including event type, event size, and the type and size of the 
recalling firm. The study proceeds as follows: Section 2 discusses the hypotheses 
examined. Section 3 describes the collection of the sample data. The basics of the event 
study methodology are described in Section 4. Section 5 presents and interprets the result 
of the event studies and analyzes how the shareholder value loss associated with recalls is 
moderated by various factors. Section 6 discusses the implications of my results on dealing 
with recalls. The final section summarizes the paper. 
                                                          
10 The contagion effect can also be called the "secondary effect" as opposed to the "primary effect" which 
refers to the impact of a recall on the recalling firm. 
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3.2. Issues and hypotheses examined 
Based on the results of the second chapter, I hypothesize the impact of the key attributes of 
recall, recalling firm, and industry on the magnitude of the secondary effect (contagion 
effect).  
A product safety recall can stimulate customers’ concerns about the safety of similar 
products in the market and drive them to stop buying related products, not only from the 
recalling firm, but also from other firms in the same market or industry.  This behavior can 
be explained by the "availability heuristic" (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973). People often use 
heuristics to reduce complex problem solving to more simple judgmental operations. These 
rules work well under most circumstances, but they can lead to systematic deviations from 
logic, probability, or rational choice theory (Gigerenzer, 1991). The "availability heuristic" 
is a type of heuristic that relies on immediate examples that come to mind when evaluating 
risks. It operates on the notion that events that can be more easily brought to mind or 
imagined are judged to be more likely than events that could not easily be imagined. This 
cognitive bias generally increases for negative events, as people apply more weight to 
negative instances than positive ones when making a judgment.  In a survey conducted in 
2012 on the performance of S&P 500 Index in 2009, 2010, and 2011, a majority of 
respondents felt as though the market was either flat or down in 2009, and roughly half 
said the same about 2010 and 2011 (Franklin Templeton Investments, 2012). In reality, the 
S&P 500 saw double digit gains in 2009 and 2010, and a modest gain in 2011. This is 
consistent with other results, in that more painful, negative events that can be recalled (e.g., 
the 2009 economic crisis) often have a larger influence than positive events when making 
judgments (Davis, 2017). When a product safety recall occurs, the recall triggers 
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recollections of past recalls, especially the worst ones, because they are easier to 
remember, or in other words, more available. This phenomenon is evidenced by Seo et al. 
(2014). For example, in early 1993, more than 700 people became sick and four children 
died because of the E. coli outbreak in Jack in the Box restaurants, which proved to be one 
of the most significant food poisoning outbreaks in U.S. history. Seo and his co-authors 
found that Jack in the Box’s stock prices exhibited significantly negative responses to other 
firms’ food crises that occurred from 1994 to 2010, especially when the crisis was closer in 
time and similar in nature.  
Based on the above discussion, I posit that a product recall will negatively influence 
customers’ purchasing decisions for similar products. This reaction shifts the demand curve 
until customers’ trust is regained. The more severe the initiating recall event, the larger the 
shift will be. A loss of sales and the cost of regaining customers’ trust can drive investors 
to value affected firms in an industry at a discount compared to similar firms in other 
industries. The fear of tighter regulation and increases in operating costs across the industry 
as a result of the recall can intensify negative reactions of investors. My first hypothesis is: 
 
H1a. A product recall negatively affects the market value of all firms selling products 
similar to the recalled product (the secondary effect). 
H1b. The secondary effect is larger when the primary effect is more negative.   
 
Hypotheses H1 is about the overall stock market reaction to product recall 
announcements. However, it is also of interest to identify factors that could influence the 
direction and magnitude of the market reaction.  The factors influencing the contagion 
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effect can be classified into three groups: 1) factors related to the initiating event of recall, 
2) factors related to the recalling firm, and 3) factors related to the industry. 
An important event related factor is severity. Two dimensions of severity are "injury 
count" and "recall size". When there is a large product recall, more publicity is needed to 
inform all customers. Publicity not only alerts those who have already bought the product, 
but also potential buyers of similar products. As discussed, bad news distorts the risk 
perceived by individuals because of the "availability heuristic". This means that more 
publicity will discourage more potential buyers from buying. On the other hand, larger 
product recalls indicate that more customers are at risk, especially when the injury count is 
high; therefore, it is more likely that the government will react by enforcing more stringent 
regulations. Thus, my hypotheses on event severity are: 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
H2a. The secondary effect will be more negative when the recall size is larger. 
H2b. The secondary effect will be more negative when the injury count is higher. 
 
The other event-related factor is the "signal value", the factor that causes the perceived 
severity of an event to be different from its actual severity. My third hypothesis is that the 
stock market’s reaction to the industry will be more negative when the "signal value" of the 
event is higher. Early theories link social risk judgments and responses to "event severity" 
measured by the number of casualties or amount of damage. However, events such as the 
Three Mile Island nuclear accident in 1979 and the mad cow crises in Canada and the U.S. 
in 2003 had no fatalities but had huge social impact and demonstrate that a property other 
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than the event’s "severity" contributes to the public’s perception of the event’s seriousness. 
This property is referred to as the "signal value".   
The signal value of an event, and thus its potential social impact, appears to be 
systematically related to the risk profile of the event. An accident that takes many lives 
may produce relatively little social disturbance (beyond that caused to the victims’ families 
and friends) if it occurs as part of a familiar and well-understood system (e.g., a train 
wreck). However, a small incident in an unfamiliar system (or one perceived as poorly 
understood), such as a nuclear waste repository or a recombinant DNA laboratory, may 
have immense social consequences if it is perceived as a harbinger of future and possibly 
catastrophic mishaps. (Slovic and Weber, 2002) 
To predict the signal value of an event, Slovic et al. (1985) developed a "Dread Risk – 
Unknown Risk" factor space. The "Dread Risk" factor refers to perceived lack of control, 
catastrophic potential, fatal consequences, and the inequitable distribution of risks and 
benefits. The "Unknown Risk" factor is the extent to which a hazard is unobservable, 
unknown, new, and delayed in its manifestation of harm. Slovic (1987) demonstrated that 
potential signal value is closely related to the position of an event within the factor space. 
The higher an event’s score is on the Dread factor, the higher its perceived risk is (Slovik 
& Weber, 2002). As for the "Unknown Risk" factor, familiarity with an event (e.g., 
acquired by daily exposure) lowers perceptions of its risk (Weber, 2006). Given the above 
discussion, I hypothesize the following: 
 
H3. The secondary effect of a recall will be more negative when the signal value of its 
initiating event is larger. 
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The next hypothesis is about the role of similarity in the contagion effect, which is 
explained by the "representativeness heuristic" or the "similarity heuristic" (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1982). The similarity heuristic explains how people make judgments based on 
the similarity between current situations and other situations or prototypes of those 
situations. The goal of the similarity heuristic is to maximize productivity through 
favorable experiences while not repeating unfavorable experiences. This explains why 
people tend to shape their world view by their past experiences and incorporate them into 
their current experiences. As mentioned before, heuristics can lead to systematic deviations 
from logic, probability, or rational choice theory. The resulting errors are referred to as 
"cognitive biases" and many different types have been documented. The cognitive biases 
resulting from a similarity heuristic include ignoring prior probabilities, assuming that 
similarity in one aspect leads to similarity in other aspects, and assuming that a small 
sample is representative of a much larger population. A typical situation that includes these 
biases is when consumers overestimate the extent to which a firm, superficially similar to a 
recalling rival, is prone to the same event that hit the rival, even though the firm is drawn 
from a population containing relatively safe firms.  
The similarity of a firm to its rival can lie in its product, process, technology, sector, 
market, industry, supply chain, or origin. For instance, a survey conducted on Toyota's 
accelerator pedal problems in 2009 showed that the public connected other Asian 
automakers, including Honda, Hyundai, and Nissan, with the problems. In explanation of 
this finding, an expert argued that in customers' minds, Toyota was rated as the highest in 
quality among Asian carmakers, leading them to conclude that other manufacturers with 
the same origin (Asia) would have even more problems with quality (Automotive News, 
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2010). As another example, in their studies on automobile recalls, Crafton et al. (1981) and 
Reilly & Hoffer (1983) show that industry rivals that produce similar lines of cars suffer 
sales declines following serious automobile recalls.  
Multidimensionality of similarity implies that firms are perceived more similar when 
they look similar on more dimensions (i.e., product, industry, origin, etc.). For example, 
two meat packing firms are perceived more similar as opposed to a meat packer and a 
retailer selling meat products. Hence, a recall made by a meat packing company is more 
likely to negatively affect other meat packing companies, as opposed to one made by a 
retailer.  With respect to my reasoning, I hypothesize: 
 
H4. The secondary effect will be more negative when the recalling rival and the affected 
firm are from the same sector of the industry. 
 
3.3. Sample selection procedure and data description 
The recall samples used in this study are collected from the meat and toy industries. These 
two industries are selected because the literature shows that the primary impacts of recalls 
for both industries are statistically significant (Chu et al., 2005; Thomsen and McKenzie, 
2001)11. The recall announcements were gathered from the recall case archive of the U.S. 
Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) and the U.S. Consumer Product Safety 
Commission (CPSC) recall databases. The data was collected for the period of 1982 to 
2014. All data about the firms, including return, debt, book value, SIC code, closing price, 
                                                          
11 According to the literature, the primary impact in the meat industry is significant only for class-I recalls. 
Class-I recalls are for dangerous or defective products that predictably could cause serious health problems or 
death. 
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number of shares outstanding, and market return needed for evaluation of the abnormal 
returns of recalling firms and industry portfolios was collected from Wharton Research 
Data Services, CRSP and Compustat databases. 
As reported in Table 3-1, totals of 129 meat (beef, pork and poultry) class I recalls and 
162 toy recalls made by public companies or their subsidiaries were identified. A three-day 
window was used for the primary event study, and recalls made by the same firm within 
two days after another one were excluded.12 This correction caused the number of the 
recalls to decrease to 124 meat and 156 toy recall announcements. One meat and one toy 
recalls were excluded from the analysis because of missing return data near the event. In 
addition, six meat recalls and eight toy recalls were excluded because the related financial 
ratios needed for primary regression analysis was missing from the Center for Research in 
Security Prices (CRSP). Similarly, for the secondary event study, I excluded recalls made 
by the same firm within two days after the first recall, leaving 117 meat and 146 toy recall 
announcements. Seven meat and six toy recalls announcements were excluded from the 
secondary regression analyses because of missing financial information. 
To make sure that the recall dates provided by FSIS and CPSC were the earliest dates, I 
used Factiva, a business information and research tool owned by Dow Jones & Company, 
to compare the recall dates with the dates news announcements were reported by 
newswires or newspapers. For meat recalls, seven announcements were not found on 
Factiva, and seven additional announcements were reported up to three days earlier than 
FSIS announcement dates. 
 
                                                          
12 When a dummy variable was used and the points were kept, the results remained substantially unchanged. 
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Table 3-1: Description of Recall Announcements 
 
Panel A: Sample Size and Breakdown of Firms’ Types 
  Meat Toy 
Initial Sample Size 129 162 
Primary Event Study Sample Size 124 156 
Primary Regression Analysis Sample Size 117 148 
Secondary Event Study Sample Size 117 146 
Secondary Regression Analysis Sample Size 110 140 
Breakdown of the firms’ types 53 meat processor 
34 food packers 
23 retailers 
72 toy manufacturer & toy retailers  
35 retailers  
33 others 
Breakdown of the events’ types 51 pathogenic  
59 other reasons 
15 lead contamination  
125 other reasons 
 
Panel B: Descriptive Statistics 
    Sale (000) Market Value (000,000) Market to Book Debt to Equity 
Meat 
Max 99,137 70,557 47.74 0.97 
Min 284 26 0.19 0.17 
Average 11,435 5,082 3.68 0.44 
Median 13,661 10,257 2.75 0.43 
Toy 
Max 74,259 42,424 15.02 0.93 
Min 22 10 0.41 0.05 
Average 3,833 3,129 3.17 0.33 
Median 4,259 4,621 2.99 0.29 
 
For the toy industry, only one recall was not found on Factiva and three announcements 
were reported up to one day earlier. FSIS and CPSC announcements were used when the 
announcement date was earlier than news on Factiva, or when the news was not found on 
Factiva. From 110 meat recalls left for the secondary regression analysis, 53 recalls were 
made by meat processors, 34 recalls were made by food processors, and 23 recalls were 
announced by retailers. Fifty-one announcements were made due to contamination with a 
pathogen, such as E. coli, listeria, hepatitis, or salmonella, and the rest were made because 
of foreign object contamination, undeclared allergens, or other reasons. From 140 toy 
recalls, 72 were announced by toy manufacturers or toy retailers, 35 by retailers, and 33 by 
others, such as McDonald’s. Only 15 recalls were announced because of excessive levels 
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of lead, and the rest were initiated because of laceration, choking, chemical, burning 
hazards, or other reasons. 
 
3.4. Methodology 
3.4.1. Event Study 
 To estimate the shareholder value loss associated with recall announcements of rivals, I 
used the event study methodology (see Kothari and Warner, 2006). The methodology uses 
abnormal returns to provide an estimate of the percent change in stock price associated 
with an event. In an efficient market, the impact of an event is immediately reflected in 
stock prices, and hence a measure of the impact can be obtained by observing stock price 
behavior over relatively short time periods. The key features of the event study 
methodology and how to estimate the abnormal returns are briefly explained here.  
Different models have been developed to estimate abnormal returns. The model I used 
is the market model on daily stock price returns, as this is the best specified model and 
controls for the systematic risk of the stock, a key factor in explaining stock returns. The 
model suggests a linear relation between the return on a stock and the market return over a 
given time period as: 
 rit = αi + βi rmt + εit (1                 )  
where rit is the return of stock i on Day t, rmt is the market return on Day t, αi is the 
intercept of the relationship for stock i, βi is the slope of the relationship for stock i with the 
market return, and εit is the error term for stock i on Day t. αi is an estimate of the constant 
daily return for stock i, βirmt is the portion of the return for stock i that is due to market-
wide movements, and the error term, εit , is the part of the return of stock i that cannot be 
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explained by market movements and captures the effect of firm-specific information. For 
each sample firm, I estimated ?̂?𝑖, ?̂?𝑖and ?̂?𝜖𝑖
2  (the variance of the error term, εit) using 
ordinary least square regression (see Eq. (1)) on data over an estimation period of 200 
trading days. To ensure proper estimates of alpha and beta, a minimum of 40 return 
observations in the estimation period was required to keep the announcement in the 
analysis. Ait, the abnormal return for stock i on Day t, is the difference between rit, the 
actual return of stock i on Day t, and (?̂?𝑖 + ?̂?𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑡) the normal (or expected) return on stock 
i on Day t, and is expressed as:  
 𝐴𝑖𝑡 = 𝑟𝑖𝑡 − (?̂?𝑖 + ?̂?𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑡) (2                 )  
Averaging the abnormal returns across the sample firms on any Day t, the daily mean 
abnormal, ?̅?𝑡 , can be expressed as: 
 ?̅?𝑡 =∑
𝐴𝑖𝑡
𝑁
𝑁
𝑖=1
 (3                 )  
where N is the number of sample observations on Day t. The cumulative abnormal return 
over a given time period (t1, . . ., t2) is the sum of the daily mean abnormal returns, ?̅?𝑡 , and 
is expressed as: 
 𝐶𝐴𝑅(𝑡1, 𝑡2) = ∑ ?̅?𝑡
𝑡=𝑡2
𝑡=𝑡1
 (4                 )  
To test the statistical significance of the daily mean abnormal return of Eq. (3), each 
abnormal return, 𝐴𝑖𝑡, is first divided by its estimated standard deviation of error, ?̂?𝜀𝑖, to 
yield a standardized abnormal return, 𝐴𝑖𝑡
𝑆 : 
 𝐴𝑖𝑡
𝑆 =
𝐴𝑖𝑡
?̂?𝜀𝑖
 (5                 )  
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The test statistic, TSt , for any Day t is given by: 
 𝑇𝑆𝑡 =∑
𝐴𝑖𝑡
𝑆
√𝑁
𝑁
𝑖=1
 (6                 )  
The rationale behind Eq. (6) is that under the null hypothesis, abnormal returns are 
assumed to be independent across firms with mean 0 and variance ?̂?𝜀𝑖
2 . From the central 
limit theorem, the sum of N standardized independent abnormal returns is therefore 
normal, with mean 0 and variance N, which leads to Eq. (6). The test over multiple days 
(t1... t2) is derived similarly, with the additional assumption that abnormal returns are 
independent and identically distributed across time. The multiple day test statistics, TSc, is 
given by: 
 𝑇𝑆𝑐 =∑
∑ 𝐴𝑖𝑡
𝑡=𝑡2
𝑡=𝑡1
/√∑ ?̂?𝜀𝑖
2𝑡=𝑡2
𝑡=𝑡1
√𝑁
𝑁
𝑖=1
 (7                 )  
Consistent with most event studies, I used a three-day event period to measure the 
secondary impact for each of the toy and meat industries. I made an industry portfolio 
based on the Standard Industry Classification Code (SIC) of the firms. The SIC code is a 
system for classifying industries by a four-digit code. The SIC codes representing meat and 
toy industries are listed in Table 3-2. The number and combination of the firms in an 
industry changes as new firms start or as current firms change, expand their industry or 
stage in the value chain, are bought, go private, or go out of business. Therefore, the 
portfolios were updated for every trading day. Only firms that were in the toy or meat 
industries at a trading day were included in the industry portfolio of that day.  
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Table 3-2: List of SIC codes representing meat and toy industry 
Meat Industry SIC codes 
 
2011: Meat Packing Plants 
5147: Meats and Meat Products 
2013: Sausages and Other Prepared Meats Products 
2016: Poultry Slaughtering and Processing 
5144: Poultry and Poultry Products 
 
Toy Industry SIC codes 
 
3942: Dolls and Stuffed Toys 
3944: Games, Toys, and Children's Vehicles, except Dolls and Bicycles 
5092: Toys and Hobby Goods and Supplies 
5945: Hobby, Toy, and Game Shops 
3940: Dolls, Toys, Games and Sporting and Athletic 
 
 
The equally weighted daily returns of the industry portfolio was evaluated for each 
trading day between January 1, 1984 and December 31, 2014. Using an equally weighted 
portfolio return prevents single large firms from overwhelming the responses of all others 
in the industry. The following formula was used to compute the portfolio returns: 
 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑤𝑡 =
∑ 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡
𝑖=𝑁
𝑖=1
𝑁
 (8                 )  
where 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑤𝑡 denotes an equally weighted return of portfolio in day t and 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡 refers to 
the closing price in trading day t-1 for firm i. To make sure that the abnormal return of the 
portfolio would not be diluted by the abnormal return of the recalling firms, the recalling 
firms were excluded from the portfolio for the dates in which they made recalls and for the 
days before and after the recall dates. To prevent market crashes from inflating negative 
results, I assumed that market returns and portfolio returns were undetermined for the stock 
market crash dates. 
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3.4.2. Capturing signal value  
As mentioned, the signal value of an event causes the perceived severity of an adverse 
event to be different from its actual severity. Actual severity can be estimated by the injury 
count (𝑁𝐶𝑎𝑠) and the amount of damage (𝑁𝐷𝑎𝑚), and perceived severity can be measured 
by the number of news releases (𝑁𝑛𝑤𝑠), which depends on both actual severity and signal 
value. By orthogonalizing the measure of perceived severity against the measures of actual 
severity, we have: 
 𝑁𝑛𝑤𝑠 = 𝑘1𝑁𝐶𝑎𝑠 + 𝑘2𝑁𝐷𝑎𝑚 + 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑒 (9                 )  
 or  
 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑒 = 𝑁𝑛𝑤𝑠 − 𝑘1𝑁𝐶𝑎𝑠 − 𝑘2𝑁𝐷𝑎𝑚 (10                 )  
where 𝑘1 and 𝑘2 are coefficients and 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑒 represents the part of 𝑁𝑛𝑤𝑠 that cannot be 
explained by 𝑁𝐶𝑎𝑠 and 𝑁𝐷𝑎𝑚. In my tests, 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑒 is used to estimate signal value.  
 
3.5. Results  
Table 3-3 demonstrates the recalling firm’s daily abnormal return (primary effect) and the 
industry’s daily abnormal return (secondary effect) for the meat and toy industries. The 
results show that, on average, the primary and secondary effects of meat and toy recalls are 
negative; however, the effects are not statistically significant, except for the primary effect 
of toy recalls (equally weighted t-statistic of -2.1). The event period equally weighted mean 
abnormal return of a recalling firm is -0.51% for meat recalls and -0.89% for toy recalls. 
The equally weighted mean abnormal return of the industry during the event period for 
both meat and toy recalls is -0.05%.  
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Table 3-3: Event Study Results 
Event period description Primary Effect Test Secondary Effect Test 
 Meat industry  Toy industry Meat industry Toy industry 
    Estimation Period -260 to -11 
    Event Period -1 to 1 
    Min. required return obs. 40 
    Estimation Model Market Model 
    Observations 124 156 117 146 
 EW VW EW VW EW VW EW VW 
Non-clustered test results          
    t- test statistic     -1.7 -1.7 -2.1c -2.7d -0.4 -0.9 0.3 -0.3 
    Wilcoxon z-statistic -0.47 -0.47 -2.1c -2.8d -0.81 -0.78 -0.27 -0.19 
    Mean-return -0.0051 -0.0051 -0.0090 -0.0108 -0.0005 -0.0012 -0.0005 -0.0015 
    Median-return -0.0011 -0.0011 -0.0034 -0.0056 -0.0012 -0.0007 0.0006 0.0005 
    % positive 0.48 0.48 0.42 0.43 0.47 0.46 0.51 0.51 
    minimum return -0.30 -0.30 -0.21 -0.21 -0.06 -0.07 -0.08 -0.11 
    maximum return 0.12 0.12 0.10 0.09 0.14 0.077 0.07 0.09 
Significance levels (two-tailed tests): (a) 10% level, (b) 5% level, (c) 1% level, (d) 0.5% level 
 
Table 3-4: Primary Effect Regression Analysis Results 
  Meat-EW Meat-VW VIF Toy-EW Toy-VW VIF 
Intercept -0.1483b -0.1500b  -0.0911b -0.0959b  
Size 0.0103d 0.0106d 1.187 0.0051b 0.0056c 1.974 
Market to Book -0.0004 -0.0003 1.117 -0.0001 -0.0009 1.781 
Debt to Equity 0.0367 0.0365 1.179 0.0302 0.0243 1.718 
Injury counts 0.0000 0.0000 1.225 0.0003 0.0002 1.169 
Recall Size -0.0028a -0.0031b 1.266 -0.0004 -0.0006 1.170 
Firm’s Type -0.0019 -0.0023 1.386 -0.0017 0.0021 2.029 
Signal Value -0.0001 -0.0001 1.010 -0.0001 -0.0001 1.163 
Significance levels (two-tailed tests): (a) 10% level, (b) 5% level, (c) 1% level, (d) 0.5% level 
 
After controlling for the size, growth prospects, capital structure, recall size, firm type 
and signal value, the equally-weighted average primary abnormal returns for the meat and 
the toy industries change to -14.8% (significance level of 5%) and -9.1% (significance 
level of 5%), respectively (see table 3-4). Firm size and recall size are statistically 
significant for the meat industry, but only the firm size is statistically significant for the toy 
industry. 
Firm size was measured as the natural logarithm of sales in the most recent fiscal year 
that ended prior to the recall announcement date. Market-to-book, which is the proxy for 
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growth potential, was measured as the ratio of the market value of equity to the book value 
of equity. Debt to equity, which is the proxy of capital structure, was measured by the ratio 
of the book value of debt to the sum of the book value of debt and the market value of 
equity. To compute these ratios, I used the market value of equity 10 trading days before 
the recall announcement date, the book value, and the market value of the equity reported 
in the most recent fiscal year ending prior to the announcement date.  
To test my hypotheses I used the following model: 
 
Sec-Abreti= 0 + 1 Prim-Abreti + 2Recall-Sizei + 3Injury-Counti + 4Signal-Valuei + 
5 Firm-Typei + i 
 
where Sec-Abreti is the event period average abnormal return of firms in the industry. 
Prim-Abreti is the event period abnormal return of firm i. The predicted sign of the 
coefficient 1 is positive. Recall-Sizei is the natural logarithm of the total amount recalled 
or recovered. The predicted sign of the coefficient 2 is negative. Injury-Counti is the 
number of recall casualties and deaths. The predicted sign of the coefficient 3 is negative. 
Signal-Valuei represents the signal value of the recall items’ initiating event.  
To measure the signal value of an event, I first regress the number of news releases 
within seven days after the event date on primary abnormal return, severity, and firm type, 
and then subtract the regressed number from the observed number of news. The predicted 
sign of coefficient 5 is negative. Firm-Typei is an indicator variable that measures the type 
of the recalling firm. It has a value of 1 if the recalling firm is a manufacturer in the 
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industry; otherwise, it will be 0. The predicted sign of coefficient 6 is negative. Table 3-5 
summarizes my predictions for the coefficients.  
 
Table 3-5: Predicted Sign of the Coefficients 
Variable  sign 
Intercept ? 
Primary CAR + 
Injury count - 
Recall Size - 
Firm Type - 
Signal Value - 
 
Table 3-6 presents the results for both the meat and toy industry. The results  support 
three of the five hypotheses. As predicted, the estimated coefficient of primary-effect is 
positive and significant. Therefore, a firm may experience a more negative abnormal return 
when the abnormal return of the recalling firm is more negative. I predicted a negative 
coefficient for the injury counts. The estimated coefficient of injury-count is negative and 
significant, indicating that the negative consequence of recall for the industry is more 
severe when more casualties are connected to the recall. I also predicted a negative 
relationship between the signal value and the secondary abnormal return. The signal value 
coefficient is negative and significant, indicating that negative public impression regarding 
an event has a direct relationship on the severity of the secondary effect. The firm type and 
recall size coefficients are negative as I predicted, but they are not statistically significant. 
Therefore, the results do not support the relationship between firm type and recall size and 
secondary abnormal return. Overall, the model is significant with an F value of 2.95 (p-
value of 1.5%) and an adjusted R2 of 12%, which are quite strong, given that my regression 
is based on cross-sectional data. 
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Table 3-6: Secondary Effect Regression Analysis Results 
 
Meat-EW 
Meat-
VW 
VIF 
EW(VW) 
Toy-EW Toy-VW 
VIF 
EW(VW) 
Intercept 0.0032 0.0031  -0.0030 -0.0028  
Primary CAR 0.1015b 0.0951b 1.030(1.040) 0.0383 0.0574 1.012(1.017) 
Injury counts -0.0001b -0.0001b 1.164(1.164) 0.0000 0.0000 1.139(1.140) 
Recall Size -0.0005 -0.0005 1.273(1.281) 0.0001 0.0001 1.146(1.147) 
Firm’s Type -0.0011 -0.0010 1.311(1.311) 0.0035 0.0035 1.090(1.084) 
Signal Value -0.0002b -0.0002b 1.002(1.003) 0.0001 0.0001 1.016(1.024) 
Significance levels (two-tailed tests): (a) 10% level, (b) 5% level, (c) 1% level, (d) 0.5% level 
 
For the toy industry, the regression analysis result does not support any of the six 
hypotheses. One reason may be that, unlike meat recalls, toy recalls are not classified into 
different classes, implying that my toy recall sample is diluted with less important 
announcements. This argument is supported by the smaller controlled primary effect 
(intercept) of toy recalls relative to meat recalls (Table 3-4). Another possible reason is the 
commoditization level of the toy industry. Materials, designs, and processes used in the toy 
industry are more diverse than those in the meat industry, causing consumers to perceive 
relatively less similarity between products recalled and products made by other firms in the 
toy industry as opposed to the meat industry. A third reason could be that, as opposed to 
the meat industry where the supply chain is in-shore or mid-shore, the supply chain of the 
toy industry is a mix of in-shore, mid-shore, and off-shore. This further adds to the 
heterogeneity of the industry, causing it to be more difficult to detect the effect. 
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3.6. Implication for managers  
My findings clearly indicate that contagion can happen even when events are common; 
therefore, it is necessary to assess and manage contagion risk. An obvious question for a 
manager is how contagion risk can be assessed and what strategies can be adopted to avoid 
or mitigate the risk of contagion. 
The findings show that for the meat industry, the risk of contagion depends on the 
number of casualties, the signal value of the initiating event, the size of the primary effect, 
the size of the recalling firm, and the recall size. These factors can be classified into two 
groups: The factors known before the event (lead factors) and those that are known after 
(lag factors). The number of casualties, recall size and primary effect of the recall are 
found out after the recall announcement, but the commoditization level of an industry, 
average size of the firms in the industry and the signal value of the typical recall initiating 
events are known beforehand. A decision maker can use the leading factors to assess the 
risk of contagion. For example, a firm that is operating in a highly commoditized industry, 
such as the meat industry, with many small competitors who are vulnerable to high signal 
value events such as listeria, salmonella, E. coli and hepatitis, is at a high risk of contagion 
because of pathogenic contamination. 
The fact that larger firms have more resources to invest in safety measures implies that 
those firms are generally safer than their smaller rivals. Therefore, the managers of larger 
firms are reasonable to deem that their risks of contagion are higher when their industries 
are dominated by small firms, especially when their stakeholders are highly sensitive to 
safety issues, such as product/customer, operations/ employees, or society/environment 
safety.  
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Given that similarity is the key driver of contagion, managers in highly commoditized 
industries should be more alert to contagion. Differentiating and/or publicizing the 
differences can help managers to mitigate the fear of lay stakeholders. Transparency and 
visibility of the supply chain enables a firm’s stakeholders to identify and recognize the 
differences between the firm and its rivals; however, managers should be careful about the 
extent of information they share with stakeholders. Some information may be 
misinterpreted by stakeholders, causing them to be mislead. In addition, too much 
information can confuse stakeholders and lead to an unfavourable outcome by masking key 
information.  
  
3.7. Summary and Conclusion 
The main objective of this research is to provide empirical evidence on the contagion effect 
of non-extreme events. To quantify the effect, I measured the average abnormal returns of 
the industry following the recall announcements in the meat and toy industries. While the 
result does not support the hypothesis that on average, the entire industry is adversely 
affected, it evidences that the industry can be seriously impacted under certain 
circumstances. 
According to my findings, the average abnormal return of the industry and the impact 
of the hypothesized factors on the abnormal return are statistically insignificant for the toy 
industry. The average abnormal return is insignificant for the meat industry as well, but the 
impact of primary-abnormal-return, signal-value, injury-count, recall size, and the size of 
the recalling firm are significant at the level of 0.05.  
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My findings are important because they give decision makers an idea of the potential 
risks involved in having unsafe rivals and they can help decision makers assess their 
contagion risks by evaluating "lead factors". Lead factors are known before an event 
occurs, such as the commoditization level of the industry, average size of the firms in the 
industry, and the signal value of the event.  
The paper contributes to the literature by shedding light on the conditions under which 
a non-severe event can cause contagion. The paper also contributes by introducing a new 
methodology for capturing the signal value, a non-severity attribute of an event which 
characterizes its perceived risk. Third, the findings can explain why the findings of other 
research about the contagion effect are mixed.  
A natural extension of this research is to test the impact of other potential contributing 
factors, such as supply chain visibility, length of supply chain, the extent to which the 
industry is technology intensive, market share of the recalling firm, average size of the 
firms in the industry, and the size of the industry. Future research can replicate the study 
for other types of events, such as operational mishaps or social responsibility accidents. 
Future studies can also test the contagion effect using accounting-based performance 
measures or study how long, on average, it takes for an industry to recover from contagion 
and what parameters contribute to recovery time. Finally, another opportunity for future 
research is to find the optimal number of days after the event for the accurate measurement 
of its signal value. 
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Chapter 4. Management of Contagion Risk  
Abstract 
Each firm faces not only its own direct risks, but also the contagion risks imposed by rivals 
who, for example, avoid strong safety measures because investment cost exceeds expected 
loss. The conclusion of this article is that, in an extreme case, low-risk firms may benefit 
from investing in safety improvements for their higher-risk rivals. For example, a firm that 
over-complies with safety requirements may benefit from investing in safety improvements 
for a rival that complies with regulations at a minimal level. This research explores 
conditions under which such a contagion risk mitigation strategy is profitable. My findings 
indicate that, for a low-risk firm, there is a threshold above which such an investment 
would be profitable. In a market where the price sensitivity to a rival’s safety is close to 
zero, a low-risk firm can decrease this threshold by extending the investment horizon. The 
investment is less likely to pay off when firms compete on quantity, as opposed to price. I 
also show that, below a threshold market price, a third firm that is neutral (neither invests 
nor needs investment) may be put at a cost disadvantage when this contagion risk 
mitigation strategy is implemented. 
Keywords: Analytics, Behavioral OR, Supply Chain Risk Management, Contagion Risk, 
Safety Investment 
 
4.1. Introduction 
Research on Supply Chain Risk Management (SCRM) has mostly addressed threats 
associated with customers (e.g., Breiter & Huchzermeier, 2015; Gümüs, 2014; Sodhi, 
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2005; Treville et al., 2014) or suppliers (e.g., Chaturvedi & Martínez-de-Albéniz, 2011; 
Gurnani et al., 2014; Wang et al., 2010). However, very little Supply Chain (SC) research 
focuses on risks posed by rivals. In this paper, I address this gap by making use of 
contagion risk and examining whether, and when, investment in rivals’ safety measures 
can mitigate it. 
By definition, contagion risk can be classified as an “environmental risk” from the 
source-of-risk perspective and as an “industry risk” from the scope-of-impact view. 
Environmental risks are defined as events driven by external forces, such as weather, 
earthquakes, political, regulatory, and market forces (Wagner and Bode, 2006). Industry 
risks include those that may not affect all sectors of the economy as a whole, but rather 
specific industry segments (Miller, 1991). Contagion is also very similar to spillover risk 
(the probability that a firm is affected because of the failure of a member of its supply 
chain), but, as discussed in Chapter 2, the process of propagation in contagion is different 
from spillover.  
Contagion risk is well-recognized in many industries, and firms adopt various strategies 
to manage it. Pharmaceuticals, for example, lobby regulators to tighten restrictions on the 
import and sale of potentially unsafe drugs which could negatively affect the reputation of 
the industry. Some industries, such as the nuclear power industry, practice self-regulation 
to ensure compliance with minimum regulations and help prevent actual regulations from 
becoming more restrictive and thus costly.  
As discussed in Chapter 1, contagion is triggered by an adverse event occurring at a 
rival or in its SC (Figure 1-2). A triggering event is caused by an initiating event  which is 
either active (evident) or dormant (hidden) and out of the rival’s control. For instance, the 
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Fukushima nuclear meltdown in 2011 was caused by a tsunami, an active incident, whereas 
the Toyota Sticky Gas Pedal Recall in 2009 was initiated when defective pedals were sent 
to Toyota to be used on the assembly line, a dormant event. The probability of a triggering 
event for a single industry may be low, but its frequency across industries is significant.  
A triggering event occurs because a rival does not comply with minimum regulations 
or because compliance with minimum regulations is insufficient to avoid the event. In the 
latter case, one approach to address the issue is to increase the minimum requirements. 
However, given that triggering events are rare, further restriction may be seen as over-
regulation and opposed by government or industry. An alternative approach is to encourage 
complying firms to over-comply voluntarily. However, if firms perceive over-compliance 
as unnecessary or threatening to their competitiveness, or if they believe that the 
investment costs exceed the expected profit from the investment, they will not over-
comply. This applies especially to Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) that lack the 
operational scale to absorb an increase in cost or cannot afford the capital investment 
where the return may be long term. In this context, low-risk firms who over-comply with 
safety regulations may consider investing in safety improvements for high-risk rivals that 
choose to comply only with regulations at a minimum level.  
A valuable illustration comes from the meat industry, where I show that a firm might 
voluntarily help a high-risk competitor to purchase kits to test for mad cow disease. Testing 
every animal over 21 months old significantly reduces the probability that contaminated 
meat can enter the food chain. In 2003, a small slaughterhouse in the state of Washington 
issued a recall for about 10,000 pounds of raw beef that was suspected to be contaminated 
with mad cow disease. Following the recall, 53 countries banned imports of U.S. beef, 
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costing the American beef industry between $3.2B and $4.7B (Coffey et al., 2005). At the 
time of the event, the U.S. had an active mad cow disease screening program in place. 
Records from the Department of Agriculture show that 35,000 animals were tested 
between 2001 and 2003, but none were tested at the slaughterhouse where the mad cow 
case was detected (UPI, 2015), despite the slaughterhouse specializing in older and/or 
injured dairy cattle, which are considered to be at a high risk for mad cow disease. 
Since many forms of direct contribution to a rival may be considered “collusion” and 
possibly illegal, an intermediary association is needed to collect and invest contributions. 
This association can also verify if a candidate rival requires such financial contribution to 
improve its safety measures and ensure that the rival follows the requirements of the 
investing firm. Investment in a rival’s safety provides a non-regulatory mechanism for the 
governance of contagion risk which can be combined with self-regulation. The culture of 
collaboration embedded in self-regulation promotes such investments, and self-regulatory 
organizations (SROs) can play the role of intermediary association. SROs are non-
governmental organizations formed by the private sector to set standards, monitor 
compliance, and enforce rules. An example of a SRO is the Children's Food and Beverage 
Advertising Initiative (CFBAI), which is designed to influence the advertising of foods 
targeting children under 12, to encourage healthier dietary choices and lifestyles. The 
CFBAI is a voluntary self-regulation program and involves 18 of the United States' largest 
food and beverage companies (as of September 2013), covering approximately 80% of the 
child-directed food advertising market (OECD.org, 2015).   
While all firms are at risk of contagion, over-complying firms should be more 
concerned as they can be penalized for risks that they have already addressed internally. 
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Furthermore, it may not be a priority for firms that struggle to comply with minimum 
regulatory requirements since contagion risk is a high-consequence but low-probability 
risk. My research asks what factors can affect the investment decisions of a low-risk firm 
and answers how variation in the contributing factors may lead to different decisions. I 
apply a mathematical approach to explore the conditions under which it would be 
beneficial for a low-risk firm to improve the product safety measures of a high-risk rival in 
a market where firms compete on price and demand depends on both price and safety.  
This paper contributes to the SC literature by introducing the notion of contagion risk, 
providing a detailed model of perceived safety, bringing forward a new coopetitive  
approach to risk mitigation, and addressing the variables contributing to contagion risk. On 
the practical side, the research underscores the need for low-risk firms to address contagion 
risk and helps them decide when to consider industry-level safety investments as an 
effective strategy to manage contagion risk. 
In the remainder of the paper, I briefly review the most relevant literature (Section 2), 
provide a preliminary analysis to set the stage for the problem formulation (Section 3), and 
propose my analytical model (section 4). Chapter 5 briefly discusses the approaches to 
contagion management. I conclude by proposing directions for future research. 
 
4.2. Literature Review 
4.2.1. Related Streams of Literature 
The first relevant area of research focuses on supply risk management in decentralized 
networks where self-interested interacting firms decide on investment to reduce disruption 
risk. Most research in this stream (e.g., Baiman et al., 2000; Swinney & Netessine, 2009) 
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explores buyer investment, for example, to enable a supplier to improve its production 
processes, or to help avoid impending bankruptcy. Researchers have also explored buyer–
supplier vertical coordination of investment decisions. For instance, Bakshi & Kleindorfer 
(2009) consider a bargaining game between a retailer and a supplier facing an 
interdependent SC disruption risk and discuss how to share investment with SC partners to 
increase SC resilience. 
Another relevant stream of literature combines system reliability theory and 
probabilistic risk analysis with game theory in the context of protecting a critical 
infrastructure from risks, such as terrorist attacks. For example, Kim and Tomlin (2013) 
and Kunreuther & Heal (2005) explore the effects of security investment decisions of one 
agent on the incentives of other agents. Kunreuther & Heal propose a model of 
interdependent security where agents are vulnerable to an externality from other agents. 
They show that when a single successful attack can be catastrophic, the failure of one agent 
to invest in security can make it unprofitable for other agents to invest. Building on this 
work, Zhuang & Bier propose a new model that assumes attacks occur over time according 
to a Poisson process. They find that differences in discount rates among agents can lead 
some agents with low discount rates not to invest in security and conclude that 
heterogeneous time preferences can complicate the task of achieving security. Their study 
shows that the existence of myopic agents can make it undesirable for non-myopic agents 
to invest in security, and hence they explore subsidizing strategies for such investments.  
Information security research focuses on security investments and provides economic 
models for both security investment and information sharing between firms. For instance, 
Gal-Or & Ghose (2005) study firms’ incentives to share security information and show that 
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information sharing and security investment complement each other. Gordon & Loeb 
(2002) developed an economic model to determine optimum security investments for 
protecting an information set with a specific vulnerability and a given potential loss.  
Finally, game theory has been applied to decide the quality choice of agents, where 
demand is assumed to be dependent on both product quality and price. Related research in 
this stream studies competition either under a vertical relationship (e.g., Gurnani et al., 
2006), or horizontal rivalry relationship (e.g., Banker et al., 1998; Xie et al., 2011).  
Our research is similar to these four streams of research in that it applies economic 
modeling to anticipate the optimal level of investment under the assumption that the 
benefits from a firm’s investment depend on other firms’ decisions. My work is different 
from the first stream in that it addresses risks imposed by rivals, whereas most of the 
research in this stream addresses supply and demand risks. Differences in the relationships 
of firms affect the nature of constraints and incentives, and hence the modeling of the 
problem. In the other three streams, firms are horizontally interdependent because of either 
a common source of risk or a shared market. In my analysis, firms are interdependent 
because they have both a common source of risk and a shared market, causing the optimal 
investment level to be constrained by investment cost as well as lost demand. However, the 
most important factor that differentiates my research from the literature is my distinction 
between objective safety and perceived safety. The common assumption that demand is a 
function of actual safety implies that behavioural factors can be neglected. I provide a 
detailed model of perceived safety and its relationship to objective safety and link these 
quantities to safety investment.   
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4.2.2. Perceived Safety and Objective Safety 
Safety is categorized as subjective (perceived) or objective (actual). Subjective safety is 
related to psychological aspects (Stoessel, 2001) while objective safety is based on more 
quantifiable measures (Suddle & Waarts, 2003). Recognizing this difference is essential in 
my research because investment improves actual safety while demand is driven by 
perceived safety. Studies on the relationship between perceived and objective safety are 
rare in the operations management literature; however, there is considerable research on 
the relationship between perceived and objective quality. Given that safety is an essential 
component of a product’s quality, it is reasonable to conclude that the features and 
characteristics of such a relationship in the context of quality can be extrapolated to 
product safety.  
Perceived quality drives preferences and subsequently sales, and it is the general 
subjective assessment of quality relative to one’s own and others’ experiences of quality. 
Objective quality refers to the collective performance of all product attributes (Mitra & 
Golder, 2006). Some researchers argue that in the long term, changes in objective quality 
can noticeably influence customer perceptions of quality (e.g., Bolton & Drew, 1991). For 
instance, Easton & Jarrell (1998) and Hendricks & Singhal (2001) show that actual quality 
initiatives take between five to 10 years to translate into higher profits. Mitra & Golder 
(2006) find that in the consumer product industry, it takes on average over six years for a 
change in objective quality to be fully reflected in customer perceptions of quality. They 
argue that this delay is caused by uncertainty, lack of knowledge about objective quality, 
high cognitive efforts required to adjust prior expectations, low involvement, and long 
inter-purchase frequencies. Some studies have found a significant effect of one-period-
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lagged quality on the market share of certain products (e.g., Kopalle & Lehmann, 2001; 
Mitra & Golder, 2006). Mitra & Golder show that in the first year after a quality change, 
on average 20% of the total effect over time is realized. The academic literature is 
inconsistent regarding the concurrent effects of changes in objective quality on perceived 
quality; some studies have found a realized impact from 3% to 22% (e.g., Boulding et al., 
1999; Prabhu & Tellis, 2000; Kamakura et al., 2002), whereas others doubt the 
significance of such an effect (e.g., Bettman et al., 1991). 
Building on the above, I conclude that a change in a product’s objective safety brought 
about by investment in safety measures affects perceived safety. However, the full impact 
is only realized in the long run. All else being equal, it takes more time to reach a higher 
percentage of the long-term effect (see Section 3.2 for a discussion of how I include this in 
my model). 
 
4.3. Preliminary Analyses 
To model the investment problem in Section 4, I first need to define the equilibrium profit 
of the low-risk firm, 𝝅𝑳
∗ , as well as the probability density of contagion, 𝒇𝒕𝓣(𝒕). In 
Subsection 3.1, I study a duopoly market and model the relationship between equilibrium 
profit and perceived safety. Using the results of Subsection 3.2, Subsection 3.3 quantifies 
perceived safety as a function of time and investment level. In Subsection 3.2, the 
relationship between objective safety and investment level is found and the probability 
density of contagion risk is formulated.  
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4.3.1. Duopoly market structure 
We consider a duopoly in which two profit maximizing firms, labeled high-risk (H) and 
low-risk (L) with perceived safety level of 𝑠𝐻 and 𝑠𝐿, choose a price level of 𝑝𝐻and 𝑝𝐿, 
where perceived safety is a measurable attribute of product with values in the interval [0, 
1]. Building on Banker et al. (1998), I assume that the demand functions for two firms are 
linear in price and safety as follows: 
 𝑞𝑖 = 𝑄𝑖 − 𝛼𝑝𝑖 + 𝛽𝑝𝑗 + 𝛾𝑠𝑖 − 𝜆𝑠𝑗  (1)  
where 𝑄𝑖, 𝛼, 𝛽, 𝛾, 𝜆 > 0  𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝑝𝑖, 𝑝𝑗 , 𝑠𝑖, 𝑠𝑗  ≥ 0  𝑓𝑜𝑟  𝑖, 𝑗 ≡ 𝐿, 𝐻, 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗  𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑠𝐿 > 𝑠𝐻. Here, 
𝑄𝑖 is the intrinsic demand potential parameter for firm i. I assume any shift in demand 
caused by safety changes (in 𝑠𝑖 and 𝑠𝑗) is captured through the  𝛾𝑠𝑖 and 𝜆𝑠𝑗 terms; in 
particular, 𝑄𝑖  does not depend on safety. The 𝛼 and 𝛾 parameters denote the demand 
responsiveness to the firm’s own price and product safety, and 𝛽 and 𝜆 denote the demand 
responsiveness to the rival’s price and product safety, respectively. I also assume that 
demand for each firm is affected more by its own price and safety than those of its rivals, 
that is, 𝛼 > 𝛽 and 𝛾 > 𝜆. This is a plausible assumption; otherwise, for example, firms will 
not lose sales if they both raise their prices by one dollar or decrease their safety levels by 
one unit. From (1), the profit, revenue minus expenses, is: 
 𝜋𝑖 = 𝑞𝑖( 𝑝𝑖 − 𝑐𝑖) − 𝐹𝑖 = (𝑄𝑖 − 𝛼𝑝𝑖 + 𝛽𝑝𝑗 + 𝛾𝑠𝑖 − 𝜆𝑠𝑗)( 𝑝𝑖 − 𝑐𝑖) − 𝐹𝑖  (2)  
Maximizing 𝜋𝑖with respect to 𝑝𝑖 produces: 
 
𝑝𝑖
∗ =
𝑄𝑖+𝛽𝑝𝑗
∗+𝛾𝑠𝑖−𝜆𝑠𝑗+𝛼𝑐𝑖
2𝛼
  
(3)  
Substituting rival’s price, 𝑝𝑗
∗ =
𝑄𝑗+𝛽𝑝𝑖
∗+𝛾𝑠𝑗−𝜆𝑠𝑖+𝛼𝑐𝑗
2𝛼
, into (3) produces: 
 𝑝𝑖
∗ = 𝐴𝑠𝑖 + 𝐵𝑠𝑗 + 𝐶𝑖  (4)  
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where 𝐴 =
(2𝛼𝛾−𝛽𝜆)
(4𝛼2−𝛽2)
  (5)  
 𝐵 =
(𝛽𝛾−2𝛼𝜆)
(4𝛼2−𝛽2)
  (6)  
 𝐶𝑖 =
2𝛼𝑄𝑖+𝛽𝑄𝑗+𝛼(2𝛼𝑐𝑖+𝛽𝑐𝑗)
(4𝛼2−𝛽2)
  
(7)  
for I = H and j = L, and for i = L and j = H.  To find the demand associated with the 
optimal price, I substitute (4) in (1) and find: 
 
𝑞𝑖
∗ =
𝑄𝑖+𝛽𝑝𝑗
∗+𝛾𝑠𝑖−𝜆𝑠𝑗−𝛼𝑐𝑖
2
= 𝛼(𝑝𝑖
∗ − 𝑐𝑖)  
(8)  
We can also formulate the equilibrium profit  𝜋𝑖
∗ in terms of optimal price 𝑝𝑖
∗ by 
substituting (4) and (8) into (2) to find: 
  𝜋𝑖
∗ = (𝑝𝑖
∗ − 𝑐𝑖)𝑞𝑖
∗ − 𝐹𝑖 = 𝛼(𝑝𝑖
∗ − 𝑐𝑖)
2 − 𝐹𝑖 (9)  
Since 𝛼 > 𝛽 and 𝛾 > 𝜆, I conclude from (5) and (7) that 𝐶𝑖  and 𝐴 are always positive. 
However, according to (6), 𝐵 may take either positive or negative values. When 𝐵 is 
positive, I can observe from (4) and (9) that increasing the safety level of the high-risk firm 
will increase the profit of the low-risk firm. Banker et al. (1998) argues that B < 0 is 
implausible. Accepting this argument for now, I assume that B < 0. From (6), I know that 
𝐵 is negative if, and only if 
𝛼
𝛽
>
2𝛾
𝜆
, that is, when the relative responsiveness of demand to 
price 
𝛼
𝛽
 is greater than twice the relative responsiveness of demand to safety 
𝛾
𝜆
. 
4.3.2. Modeling contagion risk 
As described earlier, contagion is generated by a triggering event, which in turn is caused 
by an initiating event (Figure 1-2). For example, the 2003 global ban on Canadian beef was 
triggered by a single case of mad cow disease detected on a farm in Alberta, suspected to 
have been caused by contaminated cattle feed shipped from a livestock feed mill. 
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Contagion starts immediately after a triggering event, but the occurrence of an initiating 
event does not always result in a triggering event. To be precise: 
 𝑃𝑟{𝒞|𝒯} = 1 (10)  
 0 < 𝑃𝑟{𝒯|ℐ} ≤ 1 (11)  
where 𝒞, 𝒯 and ℐ denote contagion, triggering event, and initiating event, respectively. 
Given that initiating events are rare and their occurrences are independent, I can 
consider the occurrence of initiating events in the investment horizon as a Poisson process. 
This implies that the probability that the first initiating event happens before time 𝑡 has an 
exponential distribution: 
 Pr{𝑡ℐ < 𝑡} = 1 − 𝑒
−𝜇𝑡 (12)  
Here, 𝑡ℐ denotes the time of the initiating event and 𝜇
−1 represents the mean time to the 
first event. Since initiating events are scarce and independent, I can assume that the 
probability of two or more events within the investment horizon is negligible. The 
probability of a triggering event before time t is then:   
 Pr{𝑡𝒯 < 𝑡} = 𝑃𝑟{𝒯|ℐ} Pr{𝑡ℐ < 𝑡} (13)  
where 𝑡𝒯 denotes the waiting time to the triggering event.  
The conditional probability Pr{𝒯|ℐ} in (13) represents the probability that a firm’s 
safety measures cannot detect a dormant initiating event or cannot tolerate the 
consequences of an active initiating event. Given that initiating events are unavoidable, the 
only option to address contagion is to reduce the probability of the triggering event. One 
option is to invest in the safety of the firm that is at risk from the initiating event.  
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To estimate the effect of investment level on Pr{𝒯|ℐ}, I apply the logistic regression 
model used by Major (2002) and Bakshi et al. (2009) for estimation of disruption 
probability: 
 𝑙𝑛 (
Pr{𝒯|ℐ}
1−𝑃𝑟{𝒯|ℐ}
) = 𝐼 − 𝜔𝑦  (14)  
Here, 𝑦 ≥ 0 represents the safety investment level and parameters 𝐼 and 𝜔 > 0  in (14) 
denote an intercept and coefficient, respectively. Assuming Pr{𝒯|ℐ} ≪ 1 (where “≪” 
means “much less than”), and setting   𝓅𝑡0 = 𝑒
−𝐼 by, I can approximate  Pr{𝒯|ℐ} as: 
 Pr{𝒯|ℐ} ≅ 𝓅𝑡0𝑒
−𝜔𝑦  (15)  
In fact, 𝓅𝑡0 denotes the conditional probability of the triggering event before 
investment. Substituting (12) and (15) into (13) shows that the probability of triggering 
event is:  
 Pr{𝑡𝒯 < 𝑡} = 𝓅t0e
−ωy(1 − e−μt) . (16)  
Taking (10) into account, I have:  
 Pr{𝑡𝒞 < 𝑡} = Pr{𝑡𝒯 < 𝑡}  (17)  
where 𝑡𝒞 is the starting time of contagion. Given (17), (16) shows the probability of 
contagion at or before time 𝑡. If I differentiate with respect to 𝑡, I find that the probability 
that the first contagion event occurs in a small interval of time of length 𝑑𝑡 starting at time 
𝑡 is:  
 𝑓𝑡𝒯(𝑡)𝑑𝑡 = 𝓅𝑡0𝑒
−𝜔𝑦𝜇𝑒−𝜇𝑡𝑑𝑡.  (18)  
Note that (18) represents an approximation to the values of a probability density function at 
small values of 𝒕, under the assumptions made above. Below, I will use (18) in integrals 
representing the loss in profits caused by a triggering event within an investment horizon. 
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4.3.3. Impact of investment on perceived safety 
Investment in a high-risk rival increases the objective safety of its product either by 
improving the rival’s capability to detect dormant initiating events or by increasing the 
resilience of its operations against active initiating events. Since demand shift is caused by 
changes in perceived, rather than objective, safety, I need to incorporate the relationship 
between objective safety and perceived safety into my model. As discussed in Section 2.2, 
objective safety affects perceived safety, but this effect is realized over time. All else being 
equal, it takes more time to reach a higher percentage of the long-term effect. The impact 
of the investment on perceived safety can be best approximated by an exponential function. 
I assume that perceived safety captures the changes in the objective safety at the rate 
of (1 − 𝑒−𝜑𝑡), where φ is the adjustment rate and 𝑡 is elapsed time since investment. Then: 
  𝑠𝐻(𝑦, 𝑡) =  𝑠𝐻0 + 𝜃 ∆𝑠𝐻 𝑜𝑏𝑗(𝑦)(1 − 𝑒
−𝜑𝑡)  (19)  
where  𝑠𝐻0 and  𝑠𝐻(𝑦, 𝑡) denote the perceived safety level of the high-risk firm before and 
after investment, respectively,  ∆𝑠𝐻 𝑜𝑏𝑗(𝑦) refers to the change in the objective safety after 
investment, and 𝜃 represents the percentage of the changes in objective safety captured by 
perceived safety. ∆𝑠𝐻 𝑜𝑏𝑗(𝑦) is defined as: 
  ∆𝑠𝐻 𝑜𝑏𝑗(𝑦) = (𝑠𝐻 𝑜𝑏𝑗(𝑦) −  𝑠0)  (20)  
where  𝑠0 and  𝑠𝐻 𝑜𝑏𝑗(𝑦) denote the objective safety levels of the high-risk firm before and 
after investment, respectively.  
Given that safety is complementary with risk level, I can assess objective safety from a 
firm’s risk. Using (15), I get: 
 𝑠𝐻𝑜𝑏𝑗(𝑦) = 1 − Pr{𝒯|ℐ} = 1 − 𝓅𝑡0𝑒
−𝜔𝑦  (21)  
74 
 
  𝑠0 = 1 − 𝓅𝑡0 (22)  
Substituting (21) and (22) into (20), I find: 
  ∆𝑠𝐻 𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑦) = 𝜃𝓅𝑡0(1 − 𝑒
−𝜔𝑦) (23)  
Using (23), I can reformulate (19) as: 
  𝑠𝐻(𝑦, 𝑡) =  𝑠𝐻0 + 𝜃𝓅𝑡0(1 − 𝑒
−𝜔𝑦)(1 − 𝑒−𝜑𝑡)  (24)  
We can now substitute 𝑠𝐻(𝑦, 𝑡) into (4) and define the low-risk firm’s optimal price, 
𝑝𝐿
∗, and subsequently equilibrium profit, 𝜋𝐿
∗, as functions of time and investment level y.  
 
4.4. Modeling 
4.4.1. Expected profit of a low-risk firm in the presence of contagion   
We consider a market consisting of an over-complying (low-risk) and a minimum-
complying (high-risk) firm competing on price, where the low-risk firm is at risk of 
contagion posed by the high-risk rival. Before the investment (t < 0), the levels of 
perceived safety and price for the high-risk firm are 𝑠𝐻0 and 𝑝𝐻0, and for the low-risk firm 
are 𝑠𝐿0 and 𝑝𝐿0, respectively. At time t = 0, the low-risk firm makes an investment decision 
regarding the high-risk firm’s safety level; from that time, the two firms continue to 
compete on price as perceived safety of the high-risk firm approaches the maximum 
achievable level (see (19)). From the perspective of the low-risk firm, the optimal safety 
level of the high-risk firm is the level that maximizes the expected profit of the low-firm’s 
investment for time horizon T.  
We assume that for the low-risk firm, the marginal profit of investing in its own safety 
is less than the marginal profit of investing in the safety of the high-risk firm. This is a 
reasonable assumption because marginal return diminishes as investment increases, and by 
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definition, the low-risk firm has already made much more internal safety investment than 
the high-risk firm. I also assume that information is symmetric, and therefore the low-risk 
firm knows how safe the high-risk firm is and how responsive it is to safety investment.  
 
 
Figure 4-1: Effect of triggering event on the expected profit of a low-risk firm 
 
As depicted above (Figure 4-1), contagion causes the profit of the low-risk firm to drop 
from 𝜋𝐿
∗(𝑦,  𝑡𝒯) − 𝑦 to ?̂?𝐿
∗ − 𝑦 at time  𝑡𝒯 and last for a period of 𝑇1, where 𝑡𝒯 is a random 
variable and denotes the waiting time to the triggering event. 𝜋𝐿0
∗  represents the profit of 
the low-risk firm before investment, ?̂?𝐿
∗ is the average post-event profit of the low-risk 
firm, and 𝑦 is the investment level that low-risk firm makes in the high-risk firm’s safety 
for the investment horizon 𝑇.  Depending on the nature of the triggering event, 𝑡𝒯 + 𝑇1 
may be smaller or greater than 𝑇. 
We now assume that the low-risk firm’s lost profit after the event is much greater than 
the maximum reduction in the low-risk firm’s profit due to the increase in the high-risk 
firm’s safety level following the investment. That is: 
 𝜋𝐿0
∗ − ?̂?𝐿
∗ ≫ 𝜋𝐿0
∗ − 𝜋𝐿
∗(𝑦, 𝑡𝒯 + 𝑇1)   (25)  
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which is equivalent to 𝑝𝐿𝑚− 𝑐𝐿 ≫ √
?̂?𝐿
∗+𝐹𝐿
𝛼
 , where 𝑝𝐿𝑚 is the low-risk firm’s price at (𝑡𝒯 +
𝑇1), 𝑐𝐿 is the variable cost, 𝐹𝐿 is fixed cost, 𝛼 is responsiveness of demand to the low-risk 
firm’s own price, and ≫ means “is much greater than”. Actually, this is a necessary 
assumption; otherwise, there would be no incentive for the low-risk firm to consider such 
investment as an option. Assuming (25), I get: 
 (𝜋𝐿
∗(𝑦, 𝑡) − ?̂?𝐿
∗) ≅ (𝜋𝐿0
∗ − ?̂?𝐿
∗)  (26)  
We can now model the present value of the expected profit of the low-risk firm as:  
 𝐸(𝜋𝐿(𝑦)) ≅ ∫ 𝜋𝐿
∗(𝑦, 𝑡)𝑒−𝑟𝑡
𝑇
0
𝑑𝑡 − ∫ (𝑇 − 𝑡)𝑒−𝑟𝑡 𝑓𝑡𝒯(𝑡) 𝑉𝑡𝒯(𝜋𝐿0
∗ − ?̂?𝐿
∗)
𝑇
0
𝑑𝑡 − 𝑦   (27)  
where 𝑉𝑡𝒯(𝜋𝐿0
∗ − ?̂?𝐿
∗) represents the discounted value of expected loss at time 𝑡𝒯 <𝑇 . 
 𝑉𝑡𝒯(𝜋𝐿0
∗ − ?̂?𝐿
∗) = ∫ 𝑒−𝑟𝑡(𝜋𝐿0
∗ − ?̂?𝐿
∗
)
𝑇1
0
𝑑𝑡  (28)  
In (27), 𝑓𝑡𝒯(𝑡) is the probability density of contagion which is defined in (18). From (4) 
and (9), I know that 𝜋𝐿
∗(𝑦, 𝑡) = 𝛼(𝑝𝐿
∗(𝑦, 𝑡) − 𝑐𝐿)
2 − 𝐹𝐿 where 𝑝𝐿
∗ = (AsL + B 𝑠𝐻(𝑦, 𝑡) +
CL), and 𝑠𝐻(𝑦, 𝑡) is defined by (24). Differentiating (27) with respect to 𝑦, I get: 
 𝜕
𝜕𝑦
𝐸(𝜋𝐿(𝑦)) = 𝐷1𝑒
−2𝜔𝑦 + 𝐷2𝑒
−𝜔𝑦 − 1 
(29)  
where 
𝐷1 = −2𝜔𝛼𝑇(𝐵𝜃𝓅𝑡0)
2 ((
1−𝑒−𝑟𝑇
𝑟𝑇
) − 2 (
1−𝑒−(𝜑+𝑟)𝑇
(𝜑+𝑟)𝑇
) + (
1−𝑒−(2𝜑+𝑟)𝑇
(2𝜑+𝑟)𝑇
))  
(30)  
 
𝐷2 = 𝜔𝑇(2𝛼(𝐵𝜃𝓅𝑡0)
2 ((
1−𝑒−𝑟𝑇
𝑟𝑇
) − 2 (
1−𝑒−(𝜑+𝑟)𝑇
(𝜑+𝑟)𝑇
) + (
1−𝑒−(2𝜑+𝑟)𝑇
(2𝜑+𝑟)𝑇
)) + 2𝛼(𝑝𝐿0 −
𝑐𝐿)𝐵𝜃𝓅𝑡0 ((
1−𝑒−𝑟𝑇
𝑟𝑇
) − (
1−𝑒−(𝜑+𝑟)𝑇
(𝜑+𝑟)𝑇
)) +
(𝜋𝐿0
∗ −?̂?𝐿
∗)(1−𝑒−𝑟𝑇1)
𝑟
𝓅𝑡0𝜇 (
1−exp−(𝜇+𝑟)𝑇
(𝜇+𝑟)𝑇
))  
(31)  
Coefficient 𝐷1 is always negative because for 𝑓(𝑟𝑇) =
1−𝑒−𝑟𝑇
𝑟𝑇
 and  𝑟𝑇 > 0,  I know 
that  𝑓′(𝑟𝑇) =
𝑒−𝑟𝑇(𝑒𝑟𝑇−rT−1)
−(𝑟𝑇)2
≤ 0 and  𝑓"(𝑟𝑇) =
𝑒−𝑟𝑇(2𝑒𝑟𝑇−(𝑟𝑇)2−2rT−2)
(𝑟𝑇)3
≥ 0. This implies 
that 𝑓(𝑟𝑇) − 𝑓(𝑟𝑇 + 𝜑𝑇) > 𝑓(𝑟𝑇 + 𝜑𝑇) − 𝑓(𝑟𝑇 + 2𝜑𝑇), which is equivalent to 
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(
1−𝑒−𝑟𝑇
𝑟𝑇
) − 2 (
1−𝑒−(𝜑+𝑟)𝑇
(𝜑+𝑟)𝑇
) + (
1−𝑒−(2𝜑+𝑟)𝑇
(2𝜑+𝑟)𝑇
) > 0, where  𝜑𝑇 > 0. The zeroes of (29) are 
−1
𝜔
𝑙𝑛
𝐷2±√∆
−2𝐷1
, where ∆= D2
2 + 4D1. I can demonstrate that (29) has a global maximum at 
𝑦∗ =
−1
𝜔
𝑙𝑛
𝐷2−√∆
−2𝐷1
  if and only if:  
 D1 + D2 − 1 > 0 (32)  
The expression D1 + D2 − 1 is the derivative of the expected profit at y=0. 
Substituting the values of 𝐷1 and 𝐷2 from (30) and (31) into (32) generates: 
 (1−𝑢𝐿)(1−𝑒−𝑟𝑇1)
𝑟
𝓅𝑡0μωα (
1−𝑒𝑥𝑝−(𝜇+𝑟)𝑇
𝜇+𝑟
) (𝑝𝐿0 − 𝑐𝐿)
2 +
2𝛼𝜔𝐵𝜃𝓅𝑡0 ((
1−𝑒−𝑟𝑇
𝑟
) − (
1−𝑒−(𝜑+𝑟)𝑇
(𝜑+𝑟)
)) (𝑝𝐿0 − 𝑐𝐿) −
(1−𝑢𝐿)(1−𝑒
−𝑟𝑇1)
𝑟
𝓅𝑡0𝜇𝜔𝐹𝐿 (
1−𝑒𝑥𝑝−(𝜇+𝑟)𝑇
𝜇+𝑟
) − 1 > 0  
(33)  
where   𝑢𝐿 =
?̂?𝐿
∗
𝜋𝐿0
∗ . The left side of the above expression is a simple quadratic in (𝑝𝐿0 − 𝑐𝐿), 
which has two roots. Since the leading term has a positive coefficient, (33) holds if, and 
only if, (𝑝𝐿0 − 𝑐𝐿) is less than the smaller root or greater than the larger root. The  two 
roots are 𝑝𝐿0 − 𝑐𝐿 = 𝑧 ±√𝑧2 +
𝐹𝐿
𝛼
+ (
1
(1−𝑢𝐿)(1−𝑒
−𝑟𝑇1)
𝑟
𝓅𝑡0𝜇𝜔𝛼(
1−e−(𝜇+𝑟)𝑇
𝜇+𝑟
)
), where z is as 
defined in (35).   
The root corresponding to the negative sign is the smaller root, and must be negative. 
However, (𝑝𝐿0 − 𝑐𝐿) < 0 is not possible. Therefore, (33) can be true only if (𝑝𝐿0 −
𝑐𝐿) exceeds the larger root, leading us to propose:  
 
Proposition 1:  For a low-risk firm, there is a threshold price 𝑝𝑡ℎ𝐿 above which investment 
in the safety measures of a high-risk rival will be always profitable.  
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Where 
𝑝𝑡ℎ𝐿 ≡ 𝑧 + √𝑧2 +
𝐹𝐿
𝛼
+ (
1
(1−𝑢𝐿)(1−𝑒
−𝑟𝑇1)
𝑟
𝓅𝑡0𝜇𝜔𝛼(
1−e−(𝜇+𝑟)𝑇
𝜇+𝑟
)
) + 𝑐𝐿  
(34)  
and 
𝑧 =
−𝐵𝜃((
1−𝑒−𝑟𝑇
𝑟
)−(
1−𝑒−(𝜑+𝑟)𝑇
(𝜑+𝑟)
))
(1−𝑢𝐿)(1−𝑒
−𝑟𝑇1)
𝑟
𝜇(
1−e−(𝜇+𝑟)𝑇
𝜇+𝑟
)
  
(35)  
 
It is obvious that the expression under square root is always positive, indicating that 
𝑝𝑡ℎ𝐿 always exists. According to Proposition 1, the optimal investment level 𝑦
∗ =
−1
𝜔
𝑙𝑛
𝐷2−∆
−2𝐷1
 is strictly positive if, and only if, 𝑝𝐿0 is greater than 𝑝𝑡ℎ𝐿. From (24), we can see 
that in the long run, 𝑦∗ will increase the perceived safety of the high-risk firm from 𝑠𝐻0 to 
 𝑠𝐻0 + 𝜃𝓅𝑡0 (1 − 𝑙𝑛
𝐷2−∆
−2𝐷1
). 
The sensitivity of threshold price, 𝑝𝑡ℎ𝐿, to the contributing factors is further 
investigated (see Appendix 2 for proofs of comparative statistics). I use a numerical 
example to support the analyses where needed. The factors contributing to threshold price 
are classified into low-risk firm related factors including 𝑟, 𝑇, and ?̂?𝐿
∗ , market related 
factors including 𝛼, 𝜃, 𝐵, T1 and 𝜑, and high-risk firm related factors including 𝜔 and 𝓅𝑡0, 
and the environment-related factor 𝜇.  
According to the sensitivity analysis, threshold price is an increasing function of ω 
(high-risk firm’s objective safety responsiveness to investment), but optimal investment is 
concave in ω (Figure 4-2). The reason for this behavior is that the solution of the 
investment problem generates an optimal ωy rather than optimal investment level y. 
Higher ω decreases marginal investment cost, causing optimal ωy to rise. On the other 
hand, higher ω means less investment is needed to achieve the optimal ωy, driving optimal 
investment to decline. Such a contradiction causes optimal investment to be concave. All 
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other things constant, ω is expected to be smaller when the size of a high-risk firm is 
larger, because a larger firm needs more investment to achieve the same safety level as a 
small firm. Therefore, I expect that firm size and threshold price of the high-risk firm will 
change in the same direction. On the other hand, smaller firms are more likely to be high-
risk because they can be more cost constrained than large firms. 
 
 
Figure 4-2: Impact of ω, on low-risk firm’s threshold price and optimal price 
Note: T=10; T1=5; =300,051,000; A=0.49; B= - 0.0319; CL=1.63; FL=$33,000,000; cL=$1.0; sL=0.9; 
sH0=0.7; =0.009; =0.50; r=0.05; uL=0.2; pt0=0.010; pL0= $2.14; =0.5 
 
As shown in Figure 4-3, threshold price decreases when the risk of the high-risk firm 
represented by 𝓅t0 rises and the expected time to initiating event denoted by 1/𝜇, declines. 
When the risk of the high-risk firm increases from 0.001 to 0.01, the threshold price curve 
shifts down and crosses the low-risk firm’s price faster.   
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Figure 4-3: Impact of the risk of initiating event on threshold price 
Note: T=10; T1=5; =300,051,000; A=0.49; B= - 0.0000319; CL=1.63; FL=$33,000,000; cL=$1.0; sL=0.9; 
sH0=0.7; =0.50; r=0.05; uL=0.2; pt0=0.010; pL0= $2.14; =0.5; ω=0.00001 
 
 
 
Figure 4-4: Impact of perception adjustment rate () on threshold price 
Note: T=10; T1=5; =300,051,000; A=0.49; B= - 0.0319; CL=1.63; FL=$33,000,000; cL=$1.0; sL=0.9; 
sH0=0.7; =0.009; =0.50; =0.00001; r=0.05; uL=0.2; pt0=0.010; pL0= $2.14 
 
Regarding market related factors, the direction of the shift in threshold price is the 
same as for 𝜑 (rate of the adjustment of public perception of safety with actual safety), 𝜃 
(rate of objective safety contribution to perceived safety), and |𝐵| (absolute value of the 
sensitivity of the optimal price of a firm to the perceived safety of its rival’s product), but 
indefinite for 𝛼 (demand responsiveness to the firm’s own price). The longer it takes for 
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the market to adjust its perception (the larger the 𝜑), the smaller the value of threshold 
price will be (Figure 4-4.). According to Mitra & Golder (2006), adjustment in perception 
is relatively faster for product categories with higher quality variance and higher purchase 
frequency. Therefore, I expect markets dominated with product categories of these types to 
have relatively larger threshold prices. 
Larger |𝐵| raises the threshold price and lessens the price. Larger |𝐵| amplifies the 
negative effect of the improvement of a rival’s safety resulting from investment, and hence 
has a negative impact on investment profitability. In fact, an ideal market for investment is 
one with |𝐵| = 0. In contrast to |𝐵|, the optimal price sensitivity to the firm’s own 
perceived safety denoted by “𝐴” has no impact on the threshold prices; however, “𝐴” has a 
direct relation with price, and therefore investment in markets with higher “𝐴” values are 
more likely to be profitable.  
Similar to “𝐴”, an increase in the optimal price intercept 𝐶𝐿 raises the price. 𝐶𝐿 is 
directly related to the potential intrinsic demands of both high-risk and low-risk firms 
(𝑄𝐻 and 𝑄𝐿), which are proxies of the firm’s size. Therefore, price has a direct relation to 
the sizes of both high-risk and low-risk firms. Given that 𝑝𝑡ℎ𝐿 and the high-risk firm’s size 
change in the same direction, total potential intrinsic demand constant (𝑄𝐻 + 𝑄𝐿 = 𝑐𝑡𝑒), 
the larger the relative size of the low-risk firm to the high-risk rival, the more likely the 
investment will be profitable. 
Larger 𝑇1 (duration of the impact of adverse event) and smaller ?̂?𝐿
∗ (the post-event 
expected profit) generate smaller threshold prices. Smaller ?̂?𝐿
∗ is the result of higher risk 
perception by the public. Slovic (1987) shows that the public is more anxious when a 
hazard’s scores on “unknown risk” and “dread risk” factors are high and argues that 
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adverse consequence of the events with a high score on these two factors is more likely to 
spread to other firms. For industries such as the nuclear industry, which experience more 
hazards of these types, expected post-event profit would be smaller, and hence the 
investment is more likely to be profitable. 
Regarding the low-risk firm’s discount rate, 𝑟, the sensitivity analysis shows that 
threshold price and 𝑟 move in the same direction (Figure 4-5). Higher discount rate 
decreases the present value of the expected cost, making investment less attractive. 
Therefore, over-estimation of discount rate may undermine the severity of contagion. 
 
 
Figure 4-5: Impact of discount rate I on low-risk firm’s threshold price 
 Note: T=10; T1=5; =300,051,000; A=0.49; CL=1.63; FL=$33,000,000; cL=$1.0; sL=0.9; sH0=0.7; =0.009; 
=0.50; =0.00001; r=0.05; uL=0.5; pt0=0.010; pL0= $2.14; φ=0.5 
 
Variation of investment horizon (T) has an indefinite impact on threshold price, but 
when |𝐵| approaches zero they move in the opposite direction. This suggests that under 
certain circumstances, a longer investment horizon can cause an investment to become 
feasible or more profitable (Figure 4-6). When |𝐵| is relatively large, a longer investment 
horizon causes the low-risk firm to lose more market share, eroding the profit gained from 
expected loss reduction and causing T and 𝑝𝑡ℎ𝐿 to move in the same direction. In addition 
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to |𝐵|, other factors can also constrain investment horizon. For instance, when a high-risk 
firm’s safety vulnerability derives from its product or technology, the investment horizon 
cannot exceed the product or technology life cycles. This suggests that investment is more 
likely to be unfeasible for high-tech industries. 
 
 
Figure 4-6: Impact of investment horizon T on low-risk firm’s threshold price 
Note: T1=5; =300,051,000; A=0.49; CL=1.63; FL=$33,000,000; cL=$1.0; sL=0.9; sH0=0.7; =0.009; =0.50; 
=0.00001; r=0.05; uL=0.5; pt0=0.010; pL0= $2.14; φ=0.5 
 
Finally, the cost structure of the low risk firm can affect threshold price. A decrease in 
the variable cost of a low-risk firm, 𝑐𝐿, causes the threshold price to decline and leads to a 
higher price. Similarly, smaller fixed cost, 𝐹𝐿, results in a smaller threshold price, but has 
no impact on the price. When fixed cost and variable cost are inversely interdependent (an 
increase of one causes the other to decrease), the impact of cost structure on investment 
profitability is indefinite. 
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4.4.2. Investment profitability under quantity competition  
So far, I have assumed that firms compete on price. I can also assume that firms compete 
on quantity, where prices are determined by the inverse demand functions matching 
customer demand with the quantities supplied by the competing firms, and their perceived 
safety levels. That is:  
 𝑝𝑖 = 𝑃𝑖 − 𝛼𝑞𝑖 − 𝛽𝑞𝑗 + 𝛾𝑠𝑖 − 𝜆𝑠𝑗  𝑓𝑜𝑟  𝑖, 𝑗 = 𝐿, 𝐻, 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗  (36)  
where  𝛼, 𝛽, 𝛾, 𝜆, 𝑝𝑖, 𝑝𝑗 , 𝑠𝑖and 𝑠𝑗   are the same parameters I already defined for (1) and 𝑃𝑖 is 
the intrinsic price for firm 𝑖. By following the same approach used in section 3.1, I find:  
 𝑝𝑖
∗ = 𝛼(𝐴′𝑠𝑖 + 𝐵
′𝑠𝑗 + 𝐶′𝑖) + 𝑐𝑖  (37)  
where                𝐴′ =
(2𝛼𝛾+𝛽𝜆)
(4𝛼2−𝛽2)
 , 𝐵′ =
(−𝛽𝛾−2𝛼𝜆)
(4𝛼2−𝛽2)
  and 𝐶′𝑖 =
2𝛼𝑄𝑖−𝛽𝑄𝑗+𝛼(2𝛼𝑐𝑖−𝛽𝑐𝑗)
(4𝛼2−𝛽2)
. 
From Section 4.1, I know that an ideal market for investment is one where 𝐵′ = 0; 
however, contrary to 𝐵 in (6), 𝐵′ can hardly obtain a value equal or close to zero. 𝐵′ 
asymptotically nears zero when 4𝛼2 − 𝛽2 goes to infinity or when both 𝛽𝛾 and 𝛼𝜆 
approach zero. 4𝛼2 − 𝛽2 goes to infinity when price is much more sensitive to a firm’s 
own quantity than its rival’s quantity, and 𝛽𝛾 and 𝛼𝜆 approach zero when at least two of 
the parameters 𝛼, 𝛽, 𝛾 and 𝜆 are close to zero. While plausible, these extreme cases violate 
the assumption that price depends on the quantity and safety level of both of the 
companies. In other words, in a market where price is meaningfully dependent on quantity 
and safety, it is unlikely that 𝐵′ nears zero. Using the same reasoning used in Section 4.1, I 
can show that the low-risk firm threshold price and changes of  |𝐵′| move in the same 
direction. Therefore, I propose: 
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Proposition 2: The investment is less likely to pay off when firms compete on quantity, as 
opposed to price. 
4.4.3. Investment profitability in the presence of a neutral firm 
When a market only consists of high-risk and low-risk firms, condition (34) is the only 
condition for the profitability of the investment. However, a market may also consist of a 
neutral firm (N) that neither invests nor needs investment. As Appendix 3 explains, I can 
formulate 𝑝𝑖
∗, the optimal price of firm 𝑖 in this market, as: 
 𝑝𝑖
∗ = 𝐴′′𝑠𝑖 + 𝐵′′𝑠−𝑖 + 𝐶′′𝑖  (38)  
where 𝐴′′ =
−2𝛽𝜆+(2𝛼−𝛽)𝛾
(2𝛼+𝛽)(2𝛼−2𝛽)
 , 𝐵′′ =
𝛽𝛾−2𝛼𝜆
(2𝛼+𝛽)(2𝛼−2𝛽)
 , 𝐶′′𝑖 =
𝑄𝑖(2𝛼−𝛽)+𝛽𝑄−𝑖
(2𝛼+𝛽)(2𝛼−2𝛽)
  and 𝑠−𝑖 = ∑𝑠𝑗 −
𝑠𝑖 for  𝑖, 𝑗 = 𝐻, 𝐿, 𝑁, 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗. Under the new market setting, profitability will not be the sole 
requirement for investment, and the low-risk firm needs to make sure that the investment 
will not put the neutral firm at a cost disadvantage relative to the high-risk firm; otherwise, 
the investment may be seen as collusion and deemed illegal. The profitability condition for 
the neutral firm is similar to that of the low-risk firm in (32), but since the low-risk firm 
does not invest, its profitability condition is formulated as:   
 D1𝑁 + D2𝑁 > 0 (39)  
Where  D1𝑁 and D2𝑁 are the coefficients of the derivative of the neutral firm’s profit 
function similar to 𝐷1 and 𝐷2 in (30) and (31), except that 𝑟, 𝐵, 𝐹𝐿, 𝑝𝐿0, 𝑐𝐿 and 𝑢𝐿 are 
replced by 𝑟𝑁, 𝐵′′, 𝐹𝑁, 𝑝𝑁0, 𝑐𝑁 and 𝑢𝑁. The solution of equation (39) with respect to 
(𝑝𝑁0 − 𝑐𝑁) leads us to propose: 
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Proposition 3: For a neutral firm, there is a threshold price 𝑝𝑡ℎ𝑁 above which it will never 
be negatively affected by the investment of a low-risk firm in the safety measure of a high-
risk rival. 
where 
𝑝𝑡ℎ𝑁 ≡ 𝑧𝑁 +√𝑧𝑁2 +
𝐹𝑁
𝛼
+ 𝑐𝑁  
(40)  
and 
𝑧𝑁 =
−𝐵′′𝜃((
1−𝑒−𝑟𝑁𝑇
𝑟𝑁
)−(
1−𝑒−(𝜑+𝑟𝑁)𝑇
(𝜑+𝑟𝑁)
))
(1−𝑢𝑁)(1−𝑒
−𝑟𝑁𝑇1)
𝑟𝑁
𝜇(
1−e−(𝜇+𝑟𝑁)𝑇
𝜇+𝑟𝑁
)
  
 
Equation (40) suggest that the threshold price of the neutral firm is independent of the 
attributes of the low-risk and high-risk firms and is sensitive only to the environment risk 
represented by 𝜇, market attributes including price sensitivity to rivals’ perceived safety, 
denoted by B, and the rate of the adjustment of public perception of safety with actual 
safety, 𝜑. 
 
4.5. Discussion 
The supply chain risk management steps for contagion risk are similar to steps for other 
risks, namely: risk identification, risk measurement, risk assessment, risk evaluation, risk 
mitigation, and risk monitoring.13 However, one thing that makes the management of 
                                                          
13 According to Tummala & Schoenherr (2011), the SCRM process has the following six steps:  
1. Risk Identification – involves a comprehensive and structured identification of supply chain risks.  
2. Risk Measurement – determination of the consequences of all identified supply chain risks along with 
magnitudes of their impact.  
3. Risk Assessment – assessing likelihood of each risk factor.  
4. Risk Evaluation – consists of two sub-steps of risk ranking and risk acceptance.  
a) Risk ranking – involves determining risk exposure value of each risk factor based on consequence 
severity and probability of occurrence and grouping risks into classes based on risk exposure values.  
b) Risk Acceptance – after supply chain risks are grouped into classes, they are further classified 
into unacceptable, tolerable, or acceptable risks based on criteria defined by the organization.  
5. Risk Mitigation and Contingency Plans – risk mitigation and contingency plans are developed taking into 
account resource constraints faced by the organization.  
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contagion different is the identification of the triggering events. As discussed in Chapters 2 
and 3, several factors, including the industry, size of the recalling firm, and the signal value 
of the events contribute to the likelihood and magnitude of contagion. The other difference 
is the risk mitigation strategy. As the source of contagion is a rival, a (low-risk) focal firm 
needs to help its (high-risk) rivals improve their safety measures to mitigate contagion risk. 
I discuss how a firm can identify potential triggering events and the strategies it can adopt 
to manage contagion risk. 
4.5.1. Triggering Event 
Firms need to identify events that can trigger contagion to assess and manage the contagion 
risk associated with a certain event. There are three plausible types of contagion-triggering 
events. First, black swans: major, unplanned events that have a significant impact. For 
example, the Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico in 2010 and the Fukushima 
nuclear reactor disaster in 2011 fall into this category. These are implausible, extreme 
events with little or no objective basis for a firm to predict, and as such, cannot be 
identified before they happen. 
Second, gray swans: rare, but plausible, events with the potential to destabilize an 
industry or a market. For example, beef recalls due to mad cow disease and corporate 
social responsibility events in the apparel industry (e.g., the Rana Plaza building collapse in 
Bangladesh in 2013) are categorized as gray swan events. These events are so infrequent 
that a firm or its rivals may never have experienced them, but past occurrences of such 
                                                                                                                                                                                
6. Risk Monitoring and Control – involves monitoring performance of risk response plans, taking corrective 
and preventive actions to account for deviations from desired SC performance, abnormal cases or SC 
disruptions.  
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events point to their potential. Companies can identify such events by analyzing historical 
data on negative events that have occurred in the same industry but different markets.  
The third type of triggering events falls between the black swans and gray swans.  
Similar to black swans, these events are rare, high-profile, difficult to predict, and beyond 
the realm of normal expectations within the boundaries of the firm’s industry; however, 
similarities between the firm’s industry and another industry that has experienced 
contagion may increase the plausibility that such rare events occur. For example, the recent 
Volkswagen emission scandal was the first time that a recognized European automaker has 
violated regulations so blatantly, but it was not the first time a well-known European brand 
was involved in an operational breach. In 2013, beef burgers sold under Tesco 
Supermarket’s Everyday Value brand were found to contain undeclared horse meat, 
sometimes up to 100% of the meat content. Investigations later revealed that the complex, 
Europe-wide supply chains used by Tesco included companies that were fraudulently 
labelling horse meat.  
While Volkswagen and Tesco operate in different industries, both companies produce 
commodities with volatile prices, are fiercely competitive, and have long, complex supply 
chains. Given that these shared characteristics increase the risk of opportunism, an 
operational breach in the automotive industry, such as the 2015 Volkswagen emission 
scandal, was conceivable after the Tesco horse meat scandal was exposed. Although it is 
difficult to identify these types of events, firm can expose events that could affect its 
market or supply chain by finding similarities between industries and looking at historical 
data on adverse events that have occurred in the same market.  
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4.5.2. Approaches to contagion risk management 
Contagion risk management strategies can be classified into reactive and proactive types. 
In the reactive approach, a firm attempts to minimize the consequences of an adverse event 
happening to a rival; in the proactive approach, a firm’s objective is to prevent or decrease 
the probability of the triggering event. As discussed, contagion can affect a firm by 
interrupting either its supply or demand, or by increasing its operating cost due to tighter 
regulations. Firms can use strategic public relations to manage the consequences of 
contagion in order to address the risk of supply or demand disruption. By publicizing 
information, a firm attempts to convince its stakeholders that it is free of the problems that 
have recently plagued a rival. When executed effectively, this approach can ease 
consumers’ minds and increase a firm’s market share. For example, after Tesco’s horse 
meat scandal in 2013, competitors such as Morrison’s, bought multi-page advertisements 
highlighting their "integrated supply chain" and the reliability of their meat products. 
Similarly, meat producer associations in the UK, including The National Farmers Union 
and the British Pork Executive, ran ads encouraging consumers not only to buy quality 
meat products, but also to buy local or British meat. One tagline read: "Quality Assured. 
Now more than ever, it's important to know that the meat that you're buying comes from a 
trusted source". While this approach can be effective, it can also backfire; a poorly planned 
risk communication strategy can worsen the situation by confusing stakeholders and 
further spreading fear and negative opinions.  
Another effective strategy to manage the risk of increases in operating costs due to 
tighter safety regulations after an event is lobbying. Lobbying is the act of attempting to 
influence decisions made by government officials, such as legislators and regulatory 
90 
 
agency members. For example, Jack in the Box used lobbying to manage contagion as 
mentioned in the previous section. However, this in itself can pose a risk of negative 
publicity if the industry is seen to be resisting changes that could make it safer in the eyes 
of the general public.  
Self-regulating is a strategy to prevent contagion and involves collaborating with other 
firms to set and enforce rules and standards relating to the conduct of firms in the industry 
(Gupta and Lad, 1983). Self-regulation complements existing laws by supplementing rules 
to govern the behavior of firms. Industries choose self-regulation in response to both the 
lack of government regulation and the threat of excessive government regulation (Sharma 
et al., 2010). For example, the Forest Stewardship Council was formed in response to 
industry concerns about the lack of government regulation to address the sustainability of 
natural resources. Alternatively, self-regulation may be implemented in response to 
catastrophic events, such as the formation in the U.S. of the Institute of Nuclear Power 
Operations after the Three Mile Island accident to set power plant safety guidelines.  
Investing in the safety of high-risk rivals is a preventative strategy to improve safety 
and regulatory adherence. Under certain circumstances, investing in the safety of high-risk 
rivals can be profitable for the investing firm. Investing in a high-risk rival increases the 
objective safety of its product, either by improving their ability to detect dormant triggers, 
or by increasing the resilience of its operations against active triggers.  
 
4.6. Summary and Conclusion 
Herein, I seek to highlight for decision makers the issue of contagion risk, or the 
probability that a firm is adversely affected by the negative externalities of rivals’ 
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operational failures. The large number of industry-wide crises caused by operational 
failures of a single firm indicates that firms are at risk of contagion, a situation that cannot 
be addressed by internal investment. In this research, I explore whether investment in the 
safety measures of a high-risk rival is a profitable mitigating strategy. My research 
indicates that for a low-risk firm, there is a threshold price above which such investment 
would be profitable, and this price is a function of the attributes of firms, market, and 
environment. As expected, the threshold price is lower when the consequence of contagion 
is more drastic or when the probability of a triggering or initiating event is higher. One of 
the factors that affect the threshold price is the rate that public perception of safety is 
adjusted to actual safety. My analysis shows that the slower the rate of adjustment, the 
smaller the threshold price will be. I also find that the threshold price is higher when the 
low-risk firm’s discount rate is larger. The most important factor that affects the investment 
decision is parameter 𝐵, the sensitivity of the optimal price of the low-risk firm to the 
perceived safety of the high-risk rival. When sensitivity is high, investment could be 
unprofitable, even if the risk of contagion is significant. When sensitivity is close to zero, 
the low-risk firm can decrease the threshold price and turn an unprofitable investment into 
a profitable one by extending the investment horizon. I find that the investment is less 
likely to pay off when firms compete on quantity, as opposed to price. When a neutral firm 
is added to the model, investment of the low-risk firm in the high-risk rival may be illegal 
if it puts the neutral firm at cost disadvantage. There is also a threshold price for the neutral 
firm above which the firm will not be negatively affected by the investment.  
It is worthwhile to comment on whether it is reasonable to expect similar results in a 
model with spillover effects. The fear generated by an event is amplified as it passes 
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through social links, causing a negative reaction disproportionate to the actual severity of 
the event. Since fundamental links generally lack such amplification property, it is 
expected that a small triggering event would not cause a huge effect. In other words, a 
spillover effect is expected to be significant only if the triggering event is large. On the 
other hand, it is reasonable to believe that the potential severity of a triggering event has a 
direct relationship to the size of the firm to which the event happens. This means that a 
low-risk firm is at risk of spillover only if the high-risk firm is larger than, or comparable 
in size to, the low-risk firm. However, as indicated in my earlier discussion in Section 4.1, 
I know that the larger the relative size of high-risk rival to the low-risk firm, the less likely 
the investment will be profitable. This suggests that when the channel of risk propagation 
is fundamental, there is less chance that the investment will pay off. 
This paper contributes to SCRM literature by introducing the notion of contagion risk, 
formulating perceived safety, addressing the impacts of firms’ and market’s attributes on 
contagion risk, and proposing a new co-opetition approach for mitigating contagion risk. 
On the practical side, this research underscores the need for low-risk firms to address 
contagion risk and helps them decide when to consider industry level investment as a 
contagion mitigating strategy.  
In this paper, I focus on a simple duopoly market where firms compete only on price in 
the absence of moral-hazard and free-rider problems, and under the assumption of 
information symmetry. Future research can investigate the profitability of the safety 
investment in a market with multiple high-risk and low-risk firms competing on price and 
safety, both when firms of a type (low-risk or high-risk) are identical and when they are 
not. When optimal investment levels of low-risk firms are different, one can explore 
93 
 
whether low-risk firms should collaborate and what the optimal level of investment would 
be for each firm and society. Future research may also explore how to overcome free-rider 
and moral-hazard problems and incorporate asymmetric information about the type of 
high-risk firm.   
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Appendix 4-1 
Table A1.1 Notifications definitions 
Notation Explanation Notation Explanation 
- H High-risk firm - 𝑡ℐ Time at which initiating event happens 
- L Low-risk firm - 𝑡𝒯 Time at which triggering event happens 
- N Neutral firm - y Investment level 
-  Demand responsiveness to firm’s own price - 𝓅t0 Probability of triggering event before investment 
- β Demand responsiveness to rival’s price - ω High-risk firm’s objective safety responsiveness to investment 
-  Demand responsiveness to the safety of firm’s own 
product 
- 1/ Average time to first event 
-  Demand responsiveness to the safety of rival’s product -  Rate of objective safety contribution to perceived safety 
- Qi Intrinsic demand potential parameter of firm i - 𝑓𝑡𝒯(𝑡) Probability density of contagion 
- i Profit of firm i -  𝑠𝐻0/  𝑠0 Perceived/Objective safety of high-risk firm before investment 
- T Investment Horizon - 𝑝𝐿𝑚  price of the low-risk firm at 𝑡𝒯 + 𝑇1 
- T1 Duration of the impact of adverse event -  𝑠𝐻 𝑜𝑏𝑗 Objective safety of high-risk firm after investment 
- pi Price of firm i -  ∆𝑠𝐻 𝑜𝑏𝑗 Change of objective safety of high-risk firm after investment 
- si Perceived (product) safety level of firm i - 𝑓(?̂?𝐿) Distribution of the post-event profit of low-risk firm 
- qi Demand of firm i - ?̂?𝐿
∗ Average optimal post-event profit of low-risk firm 
- ci Variable cost of firm i - D1,D2 Coefficients of the derivative of low-risk firm’s profit function  
- Fi Fixed cost of firm i - 𝑦∗ Optimal investment level 
- 𝑝𝑖
∗ Optimal price of firm i - 𝑝𝐿0 Price of the low-risk firm before investment 
- 𝑞𝑖
∗ Demand associated with optimal price of firm i - 𝑟𝑖 Discount rate of firm i 
- A,A' Optimal price sensitivity to firm’s own safety(duopoly) - A'' Optimal price sensitivity to firm’s own safety (oligopoly) 
- B,B' Optimal price sensitivity to rival’s safety (duopoly) - B'' Optimal price sensitivity to rival’s safety (oligopoly) 
- Ci, C'i Optimal price intercept of firm i (duopoly) - Ci'' Optimal price intercept of firm i (oligopoly) 
- 𝒯 Triggering event - ui Ratio of post-event profit to pre-event profit of firm i 
- ℐ Initiating event 
-  
Rate of the adjustment of public perception of safety with actual 
safety - 𝒞 Contagion 
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Appendix 4-2  
In this appendix, the sensitivity of threshold price 𝑝𝑡ℎto contributing variables is analyzed. From (A1.21), I have: 
 
𝑝𝑡ℎ = 𝑧1 +√𝑧1
2 +
𝐹𝐿
𝛼
+ 𝑧2 + 𝑐𝐿 
(A2.1)  
where 
𝑧1 =
−𝐵𝜃 ((
1 − 𝑒−𝑟𝑇
𝑟 ) − (
1 − 𝑒−(𝜑+𝑟)𝑇
(𝜑 + 𝑟)
))
(1 − 𝑢𝐿)(1 − 𝑒−𝑟𝑇1)
𝑟 𝜇 (
1 − 𝑒−(𝜇+𝑟)𝑇
𝜇 + 𝑟 )
 
(A2.2)  
  
𝑧2 =
1
(1 − 𝑢𝐿)(1 − 𝑒−𝑟𝑇1)
𝑟 𝓅𝑡0𝜇𝜔𝛼 (
1 − 𝑒−(𝜇+𝑟)𝑇
𝜇 + 𝑟 )
 
(A2.3)  
Then, for any variable 𝑋, I have:  
  
𝜕
𝜕𝑋
𝑝𝑡ℎ =
(
 1 +
𝑧1
√𝑧1
2 +
𝐹𝐿
𝛼 + 𝑧2)
 
𝜕
𝜕𝑋
(𝑧1) +
1
2√𝑧1
2 +
𝐹𝐿
𝛼 + 𝑧2
𝜕
𝜕𝑋
 
(A2.4)  
Since the coefficients of 𝑧1and 𝑧2 in (A2.4) are positive, its sign depends only on 
𝜕
𝜕𝑋
(𝑧1) and 
𝜕
𝜕𝑋
(𝑧2). In the following, I 
compute (A2.4) for variables 𝑇, 𝑟, 𝜑, 𝜃, 𝜇, 𝓅𝑡0, 𝜔, |𝐵| 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑢𝐿, assuming 𝐵 < 0. 
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Table A2.1 sensitivity of the threshold price of the low-risk firm to the contributing variables 
X 
∂
∂X
(z2) 
𝜕
𝜕𝑋
(𝑧1) 
𝜕
𝜕𝑋
𝑝𝑡ℎ 
r 
𝑟 (1 −
𝑒𝑥𝑝−(𝜇+𝑟)𝑇
(
1 − exp−(𝜇+𝑟)𝑇
(𝜇 + 𝑟)𝑇
)
) + (𝜇 + 𝑟)(1 −
𝑒−𝑟𝑇1
(
1 − 𝑒−𝑟𝑇1
𝑟𝑇1
)
)
(1 − 𝑢𝐿)𝛼𝜔𝓅𝑡0𝜇(1 − 𝑒−𝑟𝑇1)(1 − 𝑒𝑥𝑝−
(𝜇+𝑟)𝑇)
> 0 
 
𝜕
𝜕𝑟  
1
(1 − 𝑢𝐿)𝜇 (
1 − 𝑒−𝑟𝑇1
𝑟 ) (
1 − 𝑒𝑥𝑝−(𝜇+𝑟)𝑇
𝜇 + r )
−𝜃𝐵 (
1 − 𝑒−𝑟𝑇
𝑟 −
𝑒−(𝜑+𝑟)𝑇 − 1
−𝜑 − 𝑟 )
−
−𝜃𝐵
𝜕
𝜕𝑟 (
1 − 𝑒−𝑟𝑇
𝑟 −
𝑒−(𝜑+𝑟)𝑇 − 1
−𝜑 − 𝑟 )
(1 − 𝑢𝐿)𝜇 (
1 − 𝑒−𝑟𝑇1
𝑟 ) (
1 − 𝑒𝑥𝑝−(𝜇+𝑟)𝑇
𝜇 + 𝑟 )
> 0 
>0 
 
−θB (
Te−(φ+r)T
−φ − r −
e−(φ+r)T − 1
(−φ − r)2
)
(1 − uL)μ(1 − e−rT1)(1 − exp−
(μ+r)T)
> 0 
0 >0 
 
−𝐵 (
1 − 𝑒−𝑟𝑇
𝑟 −
𝑒−(𝜑+𝑟)𝑇 − 1
−𝜑 − 𝑟 )
(1 − 𝑢𝐿)𝜇 (
1 − 𝑒−𝑟𝑇1
𝑟 ) (
1 − 𝑒𝑥𝑝−(𝜇+𝑟)𝑇 
𝜇 + 𝑟 )
> 0 0 >0 
 
−𝑟
𝜇(𝜇 + 𝑟)
−
𝑇𝑒𝑥𝑝−(𝜇+𝑟)𝑇
1 − 𝑒𝑥𝑝−(𝜇+𝑟)𝑇
(1 − 𝑢𝐿)𝛼𝜔𝓅𝑡0𝜇 (
1 − 𝑒−𝑟𝑇1
𝑟 ) (
1 − 𝑒𝑥𝑝−(𝜇+𝑟)𝑇 
𝜇 + 𝑟 )
< 0 
𝜕
𝜕𝜇
1
(1 − 𝑢𝐿)𝜇 (
1 − 𝑒−𝑟𝑇1
𝑟 ) (
1 − 𝑒𝑥𝑝−(𝜇+𝑟)𝑇
𝜇 + 𝑟 )
−𝜃𝐵 (
1 − 𝑒−𝑟𝑇
𝑟 −
𝑒−(𝜑+𝑟)𝑇 − 1
−𝜑 − 𝑟 )
< 0 
<0 
𝓅𝑡0 
−1
(1 − 𝑢𝐿)𝛼𝜔𝓅𝑡02𝜇 (
1 − 𝑒−𝑟𝑇1
𝑟 ) (
1 − 𝑒𝑥𝑝−(𝜇+𝑟)𝑇 
𝜇 + 𝑟 )
< 0 
0 <0 
ω 
−1
(1 − 𝑢𝐿)𝛼𝜔2𝓅𝑡0𝜇 (
1 − 𝑒−𝑟𝑇1
𝑟 ) (
1 − 𝑒𝑥𝑝−(𝜇+𝑟)𝑇 
𝜇 + 𝑟 )
< 0 
0 <0 
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Table A2.1 sensitivity of the threshold price of the low-risk firm to the contributing variables (cont’d) 
X 
∂
∂X
(z2) 
𝜕
𝜕𝑋
(𝑧1) 
𝜕
𝜕𝑋
𝑝𝑡ℎ 
|𝐵| 
𝜃 (
1 − 𝑒−𝑟𝑇
𝑟 −
𝑒−(𝜑+𝑟)𝑇 − 1
−𝜑 − 𝑟 )
(1 − 𝑢𝐿)𝜇 (
1 − 𝑒−𝑟𝑇1
𝑟 ) (
1 − 𝑒𝑥𝑝−(𝜇+𝑟)𝑇 
𝜇 + 𝑟 )
> 0 0 >0 
𝑢𝐿 
1
(1 − 𝑢𝐿)2𝛼𝜔𝓅𝑡0𝜇 (
1 − 𝑒−𝑟𝑇1
𝑟 ) (
1 − 𝑒𝑥𝑝−(𝜇+𝑟)𝑇 
𝜇 + 𝑟 )
> 0 
−𝜃𝐵 (
1 − 𝑒−𝑟𝑇
𝑟 −
𝑒−(𝜑+𝑟)𝑇 − 1
−𝜑 − 𝑟 )
(1 − 𝑢𝐿)2𝜇 (
1 − 𝑒−𝑟𝑇1
𝑟 ) (
1 − 𝑒𝑥𝑝−(𝜇+𝑟)𝑇 
𝜇 + 𝑟 )
> 0 >0 
T1 
−𝑒−𝑟𝑇1
(1 − 𝑢𝐿)𝛼𝜔𝓅𝑡0𝜇 (
1 − 𝑒−𝑟𝑇1
𝑟 )
2
(
1 − 𝑒𝑥𝑝−(𝜇+𝑟)𝑇 
𝜇 + 𝑟 )
< 0 
𝜃𝐵 (
1 − 𝑒−𝑟𝑇
𝑟 −
𝑒−(𝜑+𝑟)𝑇 − 1
−𝜑 − 𝑟 ) 𝑒
−𝑟𝑇1
(1 − 𝑢𝐿)𝜇 (
1 − 𝑒−𝑟𝑇1
𝑟 ) (
1 − 𝑒𝑥𝑝−(𝜇+𝑟)𝑇 
𝜇 + 𝑟 )
< 0 <0 
T 
𝜕
𝜕𝑇
(𝑧2) = −
𝑒−(𝜇+𝑟)𝑇
(1 − 𝑢𝐿)𝛼𝜔𝓅𝑡0𝜇 (
1 − 𝑒−𝑟𝑇1
𝑟 ) (
1 − 𝑒−(𝜇+𝑟)𝑇
𝜇 + 𝑟 )
2 < 0 
𝜕
𝜕𝑇
(𝑧1) = −
−𝜃𝐵(𝑒−𝑟𝑇 − 𝑒−(𝜑+𝑟)𝑇)
(1 − 𝑢𝐿)𝜇 (
1 − 𝑒−𝑟𝑇1
𝑟 ) (
1 − 𝑒−(𝜇+𝑟)𝑇
𝜇 + 𝑟 )
−
−𝜃𝐵 (
1 − 𝑒−𝑟𝑇
𝑟 −
𝑒−(𝜑+𝑟)𝑇 − 1
−𝜑 − 𝑟 ) 𝑒
−(𝜇+𝑟)𝑇
(1 − 𝑢𝐿)𝜇 (
1 − 𝑒−𝑟𝑇1
𝑟 ) (
1 − 𝑒−(𝜇+𝑟)𝑇
𝜇 + 𝑟 )
2
=
−𝜃𝐵 (
1 − 𝑒−𝑟𝑇
𝑟𝑇 −
𝑒−(𝜑+r)𝑇 − 1
(−𝜑 − 𝑟)𝑇
)
(1 − 𝑢𝐿)𝜇 (
1 − 𝑒−𝑟𝑇1
𝑟 ) (
1 − 𝑒−(𝜇+𝑟)𝑇
𝜇 + 𝑟 )
(
𝑒−𝑟𝑇 − 𝑒−(𝜑+𝑟)𝑇
1 − 𝑒−𝑟𝑇
𝑟𝑇 −
1 − 𝑒−(𝜑+𝑟)𝑇
(𝜑 + 𝑟)𝑇
−
𝑒−(𝜇+𝑟)𝑇
1 − 𝑒−(𝜇+𝑟)𝑇
(𝜇 + 𝑟)𝑇
) > 0 
Since the sign of 
𝜕
𝜕𝑇
(𝑧1) is positive, the sign of  
𝜕𝑝𝑡ℎ
𝜕𝑇
 will be indefinite, but if |𝐵| ≪ 1, then 𝑧2 ≪ 𝑧1. Under this condition, I have 𝑝𝑡ℎ ≅
√
𝐹𝐿
𝛼
+ 𝑧2 + 𝑐𝐿 which means sign of  
𝜕
𝜕𝑇
𝑝𝑡ℎ depends only on 𝑧2. Therefore, I conclude: 
𝜕
𝜕𝑇
𝑝𝑡ℎ {
< 0                  𝑓𝑜𝑟 |−𝐵| ≪ 1
𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑒              𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
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Appendix 4-3 
In this Appendix, I compute the coefficients of optimal price discussed in 
proposition 3 where a high-risk firm (H), a low-risk firm (L), and a neutral firm (N) 
competing on price and demand depends on both price and safety. The parameters 
used are similar to those defined in equation (1), unless otherwise indicated. 
Assuming demand has a linear relationship to the rival firm’s price and safety, I 
have: 
 𝑞𝑖 = 𝑄𝑖 − 𝛼𝑝𝑖 + 𝛽(𝑝 − 𝑝𝑖) + 𝛾𝑠𝑖 − 𝜆(𝑠 − 𝑠𝑖) (A3.1)  
where  𝑝 = ∑ 𝑝𝑖𝑖 , 𝑠 = ∑ 𝑥𝑠𝑖𝑖 , 𝑖 = 𝐻, 𝐿 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑁 
Using (A3.1), I can then formulate profit of firm 𝑖 as: 
 𝜋𝑖 = 𝑝𝑖𝑞𝑖 = 𝑝𝑖(𝑄𝑖 − 𝛼𝑝𝑖 + 𝛽(𝑝 − 𝑝𝑖) + 𝛾𝑠𝑖 − 𝜆(𝑠 − 𝑠𝑖)) (A3.2)  
Maximizing 𝜋𝑖 with respect to 𝑝𝑖 I get: 
  𝑝𝑖
∗ =
(𝑄𝑖+𝛽(𝑝−𝑝𝑖
∗)+𝛾𝑠𝑖−𝜆(𝑠−𝑠𝑖))
2𝛼
  
(A3.3)  
which is equivalent to: 
 (𝑄𝑖 + 𝛽(𝑝 − 𝑝𝑖
∗) + 𝛾𝑠𝑖 − 𝜆(𝑠 − 𝑠𝑖)) = 2𝛼𝑝𝑖
∗  (A3.4)  
Summing (A3.3) for the all three firms, I get: 
 ∑ (𝑄𝑖 + 𝛽(𝑝 − 𝑝𝑖
∗) + 𝛾𝑠𝑖 − 𝜆(𝑠 − 𝑠𝑖))𝑖 = ∑ 2𝛼𝑝𝑖
∗
𝑖   (A3.5)  
which is equivalent to: 
 𝑝 =
(𝑄+𝛽2𝑝+γs−𝜆2𝑥)
2𝛼
  (A3.6)  
where  𝑄 = ∑ 𝑄𝑖𝑖 . Substituting (A3.6) into (A3.3), I obtain 
 𝑝𝑖
∗ = A′𝑠𝑖 + B′𝑠−𝑖 + 𝐶′i (A3.7)  
where A′ =
−2βλ+(2α−β)γ
(2α+β)(2α−2β)
 , B′ =
βγ−2αλ
(2α+β)(2α−2β)
 , C′i =
Qi(2α−β)+βQ−i
(2α+β)(2α−2β)
 ,  s−i = 𝑠 −
si and  Q−i = 𝑄 − Qi  
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Chapter 5. Conclusions and Implications 
5.1.1. Summary and conclusion 
This dissertation seeks to help managers recognize, identify, and address 
"contagion risk", an interdependent risk that is well understood in the finance and 
marketing areas, but has not yet been adequately studied in the supply chain and 
operations management domain. The dissertation discusses the concept of 
contagion in the area of Supply Chain Management for the first time; therefore, 
some shortfalls might exist, which will be addressed in future works. 
The first essay, “Dynamics of Contagion Risk”, theorizes how the failure of 
rivals in risk management can unfavorably affect other firms’ supply, demand, and 
operations. Building on the decision making and risk literature, I introduce the 
notion of "stakeholder identity", which is based on the degree to which a 
stakeholder’s risk judgment is objective as opposed to subjective. I contend that the 
closer the identity of the stakeholder is to absolute-lay, the more its judgments and 
subsequent decisions will be based on biased measures, including (a) signal value 
of the event, (b) similarity between the focal firm and the liable rival, and (c) trust 
in the focal firm’s risk management. The results derived from this essay have 
important implications for supply chain and operations management scholarship, in 
that it explores contagion risk in the context of decision making processes, 
highlights the role of stakeholders as agents of risk, and conceptualizes and 
integrates various types of contagion into a single process model. 
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The second essay aims to provide empirical evidence on the contagion effect by 
measuring the average abnormal return of the industry following a product harm 
recall. My results evidence that in some industries, under certain circumstances, the 
risk of contagion could be serious, even when the adverse event is familiar and non-
extreme, such as product recalls. The findings show, as predicted, that the 
contagion is more likely to happen when the number of connected casualties to the 
recall or its signal value is larger or when the abnormal return of the recalling firm 
is more negative. These findings are important for two reasons. First, they 
demonstrate the risk of having an unsafe rival; second, they explain why the 
findings of other research about the contagion effect are mixed.  
The third essay, “Management of Contagion Risk”, explores whether and when 
investment in the safety measures of a high-risk rival is a profitable mitigating 
strategy. My research results indicate that for a low-risk firm, there is a threshold 
product price above which such investment would be profitable. The results 
demonstrate, as expected, that the threshold price is lower when the consequence of 
contagion is more drastic or when the probability of contagion is higher. The results 
also show that the sensitivity of the product price of the low-risk firm to the 
perceived safety of the rival’s product has a reverse relationship to the profitability 
of the investment. According to my analytical model, a low-risk firm can turn an 
unprofitable investment into a profitable one by extending the investment horizon; 
however, the investment is less likely to pay off when firms compete on quantity, as 
opposed to price. My third essay contributes to the literature by formulating 
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perceived safety and proposing a new co-opetition approach for managing 
contagion risk.  
In summary, my dissertation has identified a new research direction that can 
generate novel research questions on risk management in supply chain 
management. Specifically, I introduce the notions of contagion risk, classify 
contagion risk according to the type of triggering event and form of contagion 
manifestation, and highlight the underlying role of stakeholder as the agent of 
contagion risk. On the practical side, my findings help risk managers design more 
effective risk management strategies in supply chain by integrating the risks that are 
imposed by rivals and considering the new collaboration opportunities discussed in 
the third essay.  
5.1.2. Managerial Implications 
Contagion is a serious threat, not only because it can be triggered by non-severe 
events, but also because its impact could be quite drastic in extreme cases. 
Managers should refrain from underestimating the risk of contagion because of its 
low frequency. Using expected value for assessing the risk of low probability/ high 
impact type of events markedly distorts their importance relative to high 
probability/low impact events. For low probability/high impact events, managers 
should have contingency plans in place to mitigate their maximum impact if they 
occur. 
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While all firms are at risk of contagion, low-risk firms should take it more 
seriously because their safety investments cannot protect them against the reaction 
of timid stakeholders fearing an event that is happening to a rival.  
The fact that larger firms have more resources to invest in their safety measures 
implies that those firms are generally safer than their smaller rivals. The managers 
of larger firms are reasonable to deem that their risks of contagion are higher when 
their industries are dominated by small firms, especially when their stakeholders are 
highly sensitive to safety issues, such as product/customer, operations/employees, 
or society/environment safety.  
Given that similarity is the key driver of contagion, managers in highly 
commoditized industries should be more alert to contagion. Differentiating and/or 
publicizing the differences can help managers mitigate the fear of their lay 
stakeholders. Transparency and visibility of the supply chain enables stakeholders 
to identify and recognize the differences between the firm and its rivals; however, 
managers should be careful about the extent of information they share with their 
stakeholders. Some information may be misinterpreted by the stakeholders and 
mislead them. Too much information can confuse the stakeholders and lead to an 
unfavourable outcome by masking the key information.  
It is critical for managers to identify initiation and triggering events to address 
contagion risk. Managers can recognize the events by reviewing the cases of 
contagion, not only in their own industries, but also other industries. Some events 
affect most of the industries in the same manner. For example, counterfeiting is an 
issue that can hurt all firms when it is detected in a market. 
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Finally, the fact that contagion can affect all firms in an industry provides an 
outstanding opportunity for collaboration among rivals. Such collaboration can 
improve the safety of the industry by increasing the minimum safety requirements, 
and/or helping rivals that are struggling with safety issues to enhance their safety 
levels. Such collaboration can lead to safer products and operations, higher safety-
investment returns, and ultimately, a more sustainable economy. 
 
